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ABSTRACT 
In an income tax system that comported with the economic, or Haig-
Simons, definition of income, deductible expenses would not face source-
based limitations. A true Haig-Simons income tax system therefore would not 
take the schedular approach of sorting different types of expenses and losses 
into distinct conceptual “baskets” containing corresponding types of income. 
Practical realities often require departing from the Haig-Simons norm, 
however. The U.S. federal income tax system does require individuals to 
basket a number of types of expenses and losses. For example, individuals’ 
passive activity losses can only be deducted from passive income gains. By 
contrast, most corporations taxed under Subchapter C of the Internal 
Revenue Code are not subject to many of these restrictions. Thus, 
corporations generally can deduct their passive investment expenses and 
losses from their active business income. That ability allowed the creation of 
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infamous tax strategies such as Son-of-BOSS and the CINS contingent 
installment sale shelter.  
In order to prevent the resurgence of abusive tax shelters, this Article 
proposes to extend to the domestic corporate context the passive/active 
distinction that already exists for individuals. If corporations were required 
to basket their passive-source expenses and losses with their passive income 
(such as income from interest, dividends, and rents and royalties, other than 
those produced by an active business), many abusive tax shelters involving 
financial products would not work. The Article also considers the three 
principal objections to the proposal—that it is overbroad, underinclusive, 
and too complex—and argues that the proposal is tailored so as to minimize 
these costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How should expenses and losses in profit-seeking activities be taxed? 
Most people would probably answer that they should be deductible. The 
federal income tax generally does allow deductions related to business and 
investment activities.
1
 However, it limits some deductions more than others. 
In a tax system that comported with the economic, or Haig-Simons, 
definition of income, all expenses and losses connected with profit-seeking 
activities would be fully deductible, regardless of their source.
2
 The federal 
income tax frequently deviates from that norm for both policy reasons and 
practical reasons that include administrative difficulties and efforts to close 
loopholes. 
One type of deviation from the Haig-Simons norm involves what is often 
termed ―basketing,‖ whereby particular types of deductions are grouped with 
the same type of income and are only allowed to be deducted to the extent of 
that income. For example, a taxpayer‘s capital losses can only be deducted to 
the extent of capital gains (plus, in the case of an individual, up to $3,000 of 
ordinary income).
3
 Basketing generally restricts individuals‘ ability to deduct 
passive or investment-type expenses and losses from active-type income, but 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 167, 212 (2006). 
 2. The Haig-Simons definition of income is named after Robert Haig and Henry Simons. See 
Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal 
Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 376 n.26 (1998). It provides that income is the change in a 
taxpayer‘s net worth, after taking into account consumption, or, more technically, ―the fair market 
value of one‘s consumption plus change in net worth during the relevant accounting period (such as a 
year).‖ Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial Accounting 
Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423, 431 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
 3. I.R.C. § 1211 (2006). 
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not vice versa. For example, individuals can deduct investment-related 
interest expense (such as interest paid with respect to investments in portfolio 
stock) only from net investment income.
4
 Similarly, they can deduct so-
called ―passive activity losses‖ only from passive income gains, not from 
other income (such as salary).
5
 
The last restriction was enacted as part of an effort to halt the tax shelter 
activity of high-income individuals in the 1970s and 1980s.
6
 The hallmark of 
many of these old-style tax shelters was an ―investment‖ in an asset or in an 
activity run by someone other than the taxpayer that produced expenses (such 
as for interest and depreciation) or net losses, giving rise to deductions that 
the taxpayer used to lower tax on other income (typically portfolio or 
employment income).
7
 The 1970s and 1980s tax shelter investors generally 
were individuals, so it is not surprising that responsive statutes exempted 
most corporations from their ambit.
8
 
The 1990s saw a new breed of tax shelter, the corporate tax shelter. The 
new shelters were much more complex than the earlier ones, but many 
shelters were easily replicated once developed.
9
 The newer shelters also 
shared with the older shelters the feature of using an ―investment‖ to produce 
losses for tax purposes that would shelter the corporation‘s other income, 
such as income from its business activities.
10
 As discussed below in Part II.B, 
had the Internal Revenue Code (Code) required basketing of corporations‘ 
passive-source expenses and losses with their passive-source income, many 
of these strategies would not have worked and therefore likely would not 
have been developed.  
 
 
 4. Id. § 163(d)(1). 
 5. Id. § 469. In general, a passive activity is one that ―involves the conduct of any trade or 
business, and . . . in which the taxpayer does not materially participate.‖ Id. § 469(c)(1); cf. id. 
§ 469(c)(2)–(7) (providing exceptions and special rules). 
 6. See Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1988). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also tightened up Code § 163(d), completely 
eliminating individuals‘ ability to deduct investment interest from noninvestment income. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(a), 100 Stat. 2244, 2244–46 (codified in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 7. See, e.g., James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55 
TAX L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2002). 
 8. See I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (―In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount 
allowed as a deduction under this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed 
the net investment income of the taxpayer for the taxable year.‖ (emphasis added)); id. § 469(a) 
(providing that § 469 applies to individuals, estates, trusts, closely held C corporations, and personal 
service corporations, but not to other corporations). 
 9. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Tax Shelters and Corporate Tax Management, 51 TAX 
EXECUTIVE 235, 239 (1999). 
 10. See Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 615, 617–19 (1998). 
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Instead, the government unleashed an expensive, multi-pronged attack on 
corporate tax shelters that included significant litigation, specifying ―listed 
transactions‖ that are subject to special rules, such as enhanced disclosure 
requirements, and increased penalties.
11
 The government seems to have 
prevailed, at least for the moment.
12
 In part, most companies have a lot less 
income to try to shelter given the current state of the economy.
13
 However, 
tax shelters are a recurring problem.
14
 It is not safe to assume that if the 
government has won the battle, the war is over. Requiring corporations to 
basket passive expenses and losses with passive income would help prevent a 
resurgence of corporate tax abuses by precluding the deduction of passive 
losses from active income. 
This Article therefore proposes the extension of tax basketing to 
corporations in the domestic context. Part I explores the current uses of 
basketing domestically in the federal income tax. This part shows that 
basketing is often used to prevent what Congress considers to be abuse of the 
tax laws, and is primarily applied to individuals‘ passive expenses and losses, 
as well as to certain personal expenses and losses of individuals.  
Part II of the Article proposes the extension of basketing to corporations‘ 
passive items. It describes the details of the proposal, including a definition 
of passive items that would rely on a section already used by three regimes 
applicable to multinational corporations—Subpart F, the Passive Foreign 
Investment Company regime, and the foreign tax credit—and argues that the 
distinction made by all three of these regimes could readily be extended to 
 
 
 11. See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 585–86 (2006). Professor Raskolnikov explains: 
The recent tax shelter regulations (Regulations) identify the most typical features of transactions 
viewed by the government as tax avoidance and require taxpayers to disclose all transactions that 
possess any of these features (reportable transactions). Transactions that result in large losses, 
involve brief asset holding periods, or are protected by confidentiality agreements or by contingent 
fee and similar arrangements trigger the disclosure requirements. Taxpayers must also disclose 
any of the specific transactions designated by the government as, essentially, illegitimate tax 
shelters (listed transactions). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 . . . expanded the 
Regulations‘ reach even further, and backed them up with new penalties, including an unheard-of 
fine for tax advisors equal to $10,000 for each day of a violation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 12. See Victor Fleischer, The Tax Shelter War is Over, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG: BUS., L., 
ECON. & SOC‘Y (Oct. 28, 2006), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/10/the_tax_shelter.html 
(quoting former Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Pamela Olson as stating, ―‗The tax shelter 
war is over. The government won.‘‖).  
 13. See Calvin H. Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General Disallowance of 
Artificial Losses, 122 TAX NOTES 1389, 1391 (2009) (―Shelters may not reemerge as a major problem 
soon, both because [of other] . . . forces . . . and, regrettably, because there may not be much income 
needing sheltering for the next few years.‖). 
 14. See id. (―It would be a major mistake . . . to assume that the tax shelter dragon has been slain 
once and for all.‖). 
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the domestic context. Part II also discusses the effect the proposal would 
have on tax shelters, applying it to specific tax shelters that would not have 
worked had the proposed provision existed at the time. 
Part III considers possible objections to the proposal. First, it considers 
the argument that basketing is underinclusive (not addressing all tax 
sheltering). In this regard, it both (1) draws on the analysis in Part II, which 
shows that the proposal targets the shelters that are most easily replicated, 
and (2) considers possible ploys to avoid the impact of the proposal. Second, 
Part III addresses the point that basketing inevitably is overinclusive, 
throwing out some wheat with the chaff. Finally, this Part considers the issue 
of complexity and, in particular, the possible objection that it is simply too 
difficult for corporations to separate their passive and active items. However, 
as discussed in Part II, multinational corporations are already required to do 
that sorting for several other purposes. The Article therefore concludes that 
extending basketing to corporations in the domestic context would give rise 
to substantial benefits that likely would justify its costs. 
I. TAX BASKETING IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
The tax base of the federal income tax is ―taxable income.‖15 Taxable 
income generally is comprised of gross income less deductions, though the 
calculation differs somewhat for individuals depending on whether they 
itemize their deductions or simply claim the standard deduction.
16
 Most 
deductions can be claimed without basketing.
17
 Therefore, the federal income 
tax generally is not what is termed a ―schedular‖ system, under which 
income is routinely sorted by type.
18
 However, some provisions do limit 
certain deductions by requiring basketing.
19
 This Part discusses the 
mechanics of basketing, as well as several major basketing provisions and 
the rationales behind them. 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (2006)  (applying tax rates to ―taxable income‖ of individuals); id. 
§ 11(a) (applying tax rates to ―taxable income‖ of corporations). 
 16. See id. § 63. 
 17. See Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax 
Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499, 566 (1989) (―The use of 
baskets to limit deductions represents a significant departure from the long-standing approach of the 
federal income tax system in combining all of a taxpayer‘s items of income or loss into a single basket 
and thus allowing any loss to offset any income, no matter how unrelated.‖). 
 18. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & 
POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 145, 159 (1998) (―Schedular systems consist of a series of different taxes, each with 
its own rate, on different classes (schedules) of income, such as wages, interest, rents, and business 
profits.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 19. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18. 
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A. The Mechanics of Basketing 
Basketing involves the grouping together of related income and 
deductions, and is an exception to the general rule under the federal income 
tax system of allowing deductions to be taken from income of any type.
20
 To 
understand the mechanics of basketing, first consider a situation without 
basketing in which the taxpayer has income of $100,000 from an investment 
and a business-related loss of $20,000. The tax treatment of just those two 
items (that is, ignoring deductions available to individuals, such as the 
standard deduction
21
 and personal exemption
22
) is as follows: 
Gross income $100,000 
Deduction <$20,000> 
Taxable income   $80,000 
That example does not involve basketing; a deduction of one type 
(business) was allowed against income of another type (investment). Now 
consider an example involving basketing. Imagine that the taxpayer has 
$100,000 of business income and $20,000 of investment interest expense. As 
discussed below,
23
 the taxpayer can only deduct the investment interest to the 
extent of net investment income,
24
 and the taxpayer has no investment 
income in this example. The taxpayer therefore cannot take the investment 
interest expense as a deduction this year. Accordingly, the taxpayer‘s tax 
treatment of these two transactions is as follows: 
Gross income $100,000 
Deduction        <$0> 
Taxable income $100,000 
Note that the deduction in this example was disallowed because of the 
absence of income of the same type. The converse is not true, however. That 
is, income inclusion is not limited by basketing—only deductions are.25 
 
 
 20. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 21. See I.R.C. § 63(b)–(c). 
 22. See id. § 151. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 38–42. 
 24. I.R.C. § 163(d). 
 25. By contrast, in a ―schedular‖ tax system, income typically is taxed only if it is of a type that 
falls on one of the schedules, although one schedule may be a catch-all category. See William B. 
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Thus, in the first example, the investment income was included in gross 
income despite the absence of any investment expenses. 
Another illustration of this principle involves the limitation on capital 
losses, also discussed below.
26
 Capital losses are deductible only from capital 
gains, plus, for noncorporate taxpayers, up to $3,000 of ordinary income.
27
 It 
is only capital losses, not gains, that are subject to the limitation;
28
 regardless 
of the presence of capital losses, capital gains constitute gross income.
29
 For 
example, if a taxpayer has $100,000 of capital gains for the year, all 
$100,000 constitutes gross income.
30
 If that same taxpayer is a corporation 
and also has $110,000 of otherwise deductible capital losses for the same 
year, only $100,000 of the capital losses will be deductible.
31
 
In each of the situations described thus far, the basketing requirement 
applies to items of particular types (such as investment interest or capital 
losses). Basketing can be done in other ways, as well. For example, it could 
be done with respect to a specific activity only, so that expenses and losses 
from one activity cannot offset the income from another activity, even if they 
are of the same type. An example of that is the so-called ―hobby loss‖ rules 
of Code § 183 discussed below,
32
 which allow limited deductions with 
respect to activities not engaged in for profit.
33
 Under § 183, each hobby is 
considered separately, so that losses incurred in one hobby are not deductible 
from income produced by another hobby.
34
 Similarly, the ―at risk‖ rules of 
Code § 465, which restrict the loss deductions available to individuals and C 
corporations for borrowed amounts for which the taxpayer does not have 
personal liability or property at risk,
35
 apply activity by activity.
36
  
                                                                                                                         
 
Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United Kingdom and the United States, 46 
CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 19 (1996) (―Schedular taxation gives nations the option of being highly selective 
in the kinds of income taxed, and they may easily use schedular taxation to tax different income at 
different rates. The process of assigning income to schedules limits taxable income unless there is a 
category for all other income.‖). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 60–63. 
 27. I.R.C. § 1211(b). 
 28. See id. § 1211. 
 29. See id. § 61(a)(3). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. § 1211(a).  
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 71–73. 
 33. See I.R.C. § 183. 
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 71–73. Whether a taxpayer‘s activities constitute one 
hobby or more than one is determined based on the facts and circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-
1(d)(1) (2010) (―Generally, the most significant facts and circumstances . . . are the degree of 
organizational and economic interrelationship of various undertakings, the business purpose which is 
(or might be) served by carrying on the various undertakings separately or together in a trade or 
business or in an investment setting, and the similarity of various undertakings.‖). 
 35. See I.R.C. § 465(a)–(b). 
 36. See id. § 465(a)(1) (referring to ―an activity to which this section applies,‖ and providing that 
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B. Examples of Basketing Rules for Individuals 
Under current law, individuals are required to basket several types of 
expenses and losses. Typically, business expenses and losses are deductible 
from income from any source. Often, passive investment items are basketed, 
though the hobby and gambling loss provisions impose basketing on personal 
expenses and losses. This Section discusses five major basketing 
requirements that apply to individuals and examines the rationales supporting 
each of them. The common thread is that, in each case, Congress desired to 
limit the deductibility of a particular type of expense or loss from unrelated 
income to protect the integrity of the tax base in some way. While some of 
the provisions discussed below prevent the deduction either of tax-preferred 
items from nonpreferred income or the deduction of personal losses, others 
were developed to target abusive tax shelter activity.  
1. The Limitation on the Deduction of Investment Interest 
Taxpayers generally may deduct their interest expense from their income 
from any source.
37
 However, Code § 163(d) provides: ―In the case of a 
taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as a deduction under 
this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the 
net investment income of the taxpayer for the taxable year.‖38 Accordingly, 
noncorporate taxpayers, such as individuals, must basket their investment 
interest expense for the year with their ―net investment income‖ for the year, 
which is ―the excess of . . . investment income, over . . . investment 
expenses.‖39 Investment income generally consists of income from 
investment property, with specified exceptions.
40
 Investment expenses are 
those ―which are directly connected with the production of investment 
income.‖41 Any disallowed deduction can be carried forward until the 
taxpayer has sufficient net investment income to take the deduction.
42
 
                                                                                                                         
 
―any loss from such activity for the taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent of the aggregate 
amount with respect to which the taxpayer is at risk (within the meaning of subsection (b)) for such 
activity at the close of the taxable year‖ (emphasis added)); see also id. § 465(c)(2) (providing 
separation and aggregation rules for identifying activities). 
 37. See id. § 163(a). 
 38. Id. § 163(d)(1). 
 39. Id. § 163(d)(4)(A). 
 40. See id. § 163(d)(4) (providing special computation for capital gains and an election to take 
qualified dividend income into account). 
 41. Id. § 163(d)(4)(C).  
 42. Id. § 163(d)(2). 
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The legislative history of § 163(d) focuses on the mismatching of income 
and deductions.
43
 In part, that is because if the taxpayer invests in an asset 
that produces little current income, but an interest deduction were allowed, 
the deduction would precede the income, with the income being deferred 
until the taxpayer sold the asset.
44
 In addition, if investment interest were 
fully deductible, an individual taxpayer could deduct investment interest at 
ordinary income rates but hold the underlying investment until it appreciated, 
giving rise to gain on sale that would be taxed at lower capital gains rates.
45
 
When enacting § 163(d) in 1969, Congress noted: 
Since the amount of funds borrowed by a taxpayer for investment 
purposes generally is within the taxpayer‘s control, it would appear 
that a taxpayer who incurs interest expense for this purpose, which is 
substantially in excess of his investment income, is primarily 
interested in obtaining the resulting mismatching of income and the 
expense of earning that income, so as to be able to insulate other 
income from taxation.
46
 
Congress further found that a number of high-income individuals had used 
excess investment interest to shelter unrelated income on their 1966 returns.
47
 
The initial § 163(d) limitation allowed individuals to deduct up to 
$25,000 of excess investment interest.
48
 Congress subsequently reduced that 
amount
49
 and, in 1986, entirely eliminated individuals‘ ability to deduct 
investment interest from other income.
50
 Because the deductibility of interest 
 
 
 43. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 72 (1969). 
 44. See id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 17, at 562  (―The preference concerned in cases to 
which section 163(d) applies will usually be the deferral of tax on unrealized appreciation.‖). 
 45. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 72. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 72–73. 
 48. Id. at 73. 
 49. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 209(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1542, 1542–43 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Flood v. United States, 33 F.3d 
1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 1994) (―As amended in 1976, the § 163(d)(1) limitation on deduction of 
investment interest was equal to the taxpayer‘s net investment income during the taxable year plus 
$10,000,‖ and was limited to the taxpayer‘s net investment income plus $5,000 in the case of a married 
taxpayer filing separately.). 
 50. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(a), 100 Stat. 2244, 2244–46 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also I.R.C. § 163(d) (2006) (limiting the deductibility 
of investment interest). ―Investment interest‖ is defined as interest paid on indebtedness allocable to 
property held for investment. I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A). ―Property held for investment‖ includes: 
 (i) any property which produces income of a type described in section 469(e)(1) [in general, 
interest, dividends, annuities, or royalties not derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business], 
and  
 (ii) any interest held by a taxpayer in an activity involving the conduct of a trade or 
business— 
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was critical for many tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s,
51
 it served as an 
anti-tax shelter device.
52
  
2. The Passive Activity Loss Rules 
The passive activity loss provisions of Code § 469 apply to individuals 
and other taxpayers, including some corporations taxed under Subchapter C, 
but not to widely held corporations.
53
 They require a taxpayer who invests in 
trade or business or income-producing activities (other than portfolio 
investments) in which the taxpayer does not ―materially participate‖ to defer 
the deduction of net losses to a year in which the taxpayer has sufficient 
income from those activities
54
 or disposes of the investment.
55
 Material 
participation is defined as ―involve[ment] in the operations of the activity on 
a basis which is—(A) regular, (B) continuous, and (C) substantial.‖56  
Section 469 was enacted in 1986 in an effort to put a stop to the tax 
shelters of the 1970s and 1980s.
57
 The legislative history explains:  
[I]nstances in which the tax system applies simple rules at the expense 
of economic accuracy encourage the structuring of transactions to take 
advantage of the situations in which such rules give rise to 
                                                                                                                         
 
  (I) which is not a passive activity, and  
  (II) with respect to which the taxpayer does not materially participate.  
Id. § 163(d)(5)(A).  
 51. See Zelenak, supra note 17, at 509–10 (―[T]he interest deduction plays a crucial role in the 
operation of a tax shelter. . . . [T]axable income will be less than economic income if interest is fully 
deductible and the related income is not fully taxed because of a preference.‖). 
 52. Id. at 564  (―Considered together, sections 469 and 163(d) constitute a ‗two basket‘ approach 
to tax shelter limitations.‖); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Anti-Tax Shelter Rules: Protecting 
the Earned Income Tax Base, 71 TAXES 859, 867 (1993). 
 53. See I.R.C. § 469(a)(2). ―Preservation of the corporate sector tax base was not the goal here, 
since most passive-type income enterprises traditionally have chosen the partnership form.‖ John W. 
Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service 
Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 109–10 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
In fact: 
The application of the passive loss rules to corporations is to prevent the owner from contributing 
portfolio income property to a C corporation that would offset corporate passive losses. Thus, 
while passive losses generally cannot be used by a closely held C corporation to offset portfolio 
income, Section 469(e)(2) permits active income (i.e., normal business income) of a closely held 
C corporation to be offset by passive losses. 
Kenneth A. Hansen, Strategies to Avoid Passive Activity Loss Limits, 25 TAX‘N FOR LAW. 365, 367 
(1997).   
 54. See I.R.C. § 469(a)–(b). 
 55. Id. § 469(g).  
 56. Id. § 469(h)(1). 
 57. See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from 
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 218–19 (2001). 
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undermeasurement or deferral of income. Such transactions 
commonly are marketed to investors who do not intend to participate 
in the transactions, as devices for sheltering unrelated sources of 
positive income . . . . Accordingly, by creating a bar against the use of 
losses from business activities in which the taxpayer does not 
materially participate to offset positive income sources such as salary 
and portfolio income, the committee believes that it is possible 
significantly to reduce the tax shelter problem.
58
 
The passive activity loss rules were in fact highly effective in combating 
this breed of shelters because the high-income taxpayers who invested in 
them did not participate in the underlying activities; they simply invested 
passively.
59
  
3. The Limitation on Capital Losses 
Unlike the limitation on investment interest and the passive activity loss 
rules, the limitation on capital losses applies to C corporations, as well as to 
individuals. Under Code § 1211, corporate taxpayers can deduct capital 
losses only to the extent of capital gains,
60
 and noncorporate taxpayers, such 
as individuals, can deduct capital losses to the extent of capital gains, plus up 
to $3,000 of ordinary income.
61
 Noncorporate taxpayers can carry forward 
disallowed losses indefinitely;
62
 corporations are subject to a limited 
carryover period, as well as a carryback period.
63
  
An important justification for § 1211 is the taxpayer‘s power to time the 
recognition of gains and losses by selling property with built-in losses and 
retaining property that would give rise to a gain when sold.
64
 In addition, the 
existence of a capital gains preference provides another rationale: 
 
 
 58. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 716 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4235. 
 59. See Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the 
Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1432–33 (2004); see also Peroni, supra note 6, at 3 n.12 
(―The enactment of § 469 has undoubtedly led taxpayers and their advisers to place much greater 
emphasis on an investment‘s potential for making an economic profit, as opposed to its tax benefits.‖). 
 60. I.R.C. § 1211(a). 
 61. Id. § 1211(b). 
 62. Id. § 1212(b). 
 63. See id. § 1212(a). 
 64. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 339 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3235 
(―Because taxpayers have discretion over when they realize their capital gains and losses, unlimited 
deductibility of net capital losses against ordinary income would encourage investors to realize their 
capital losses immediately to gain the benefit of the deduction against ordinary income but to defer 
realization of their capital gains.‖); Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1989). 
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[T]o-day the taxpayer pays a maximum tax of 12 1/2 per cent on gains 
derived from the sale of capital assets, but is allowed to deduct in full 
from his taxable income his net losses resulting from the sale of 
capital assets during the taxable year. The injustice to the Government 
is too obvious to require much comment. . . . The Government can 
collect but 12 1/2 per cent of a gain, but it is compelled to lighten the 
burden of the taxpayer to the extent of 58 per cent of his losses.
65
 
However, this concern does not exist with respect to corporations under 
current law. Currently, corporations do not benefit from reduced rates on 
capital gains,
66
 unlike individuals.
67
  
4. Hobby Losses 
In general, personal expenses are not deductible.
68
 Personal expenses 
generally consist of expenses incurred in activities not engaged in for the 
production of income—activities that are neither investment nor business 
related, but are engaged in for their entertainment or consumption value. 
Gross income does not generally exclude personal-source income, 
however,
69
 and some activities that are primarily personal may give rise to 
occasional receipts.  
For example, the taxpayer might be an amateur tennis player who 
occasionally wins a cash prize, or might breed racehorses that sometimes win 
substantial amounts but cost much more than that each year to maintain. The 
prizes and awards are included in gross income.
70
 Code § 183, which governs 
―hobby losses,‖ essentially allows expenses and losses that would be 
deductible if the activity were engaged in for profit to be deducted up to the 
income from the particular activity.
71
 Thus, if the taxpayer plays tennis and 
breeds racehorses, he or she generally can deduct tennis expenses up to the 
income from the tennis activity for the year and horse expenses up to the 
income from the horse-breeding activity for the year, but cannot deduct the 
 
 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 67-1388, at 2 (1923). 
 66. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (taxing corporations at rates up to 35%); id. § 1201 (applying maximum 
rate of 35% to corporations‘ net capital gains). 
 67. See id. § 1(h). 
 68. Id. § 262(a) (―Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be 
allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.‖). 
 69. See id. § 61 (generally defining ―gross income‖ as ―all income from whatever source 
derived‖). 
 70. Id. §§ 61, 74. 
 71. Id. § 183(b). 
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expenses of one activity from the income of the other.
72
 Section 183 does not 
allow taxpayers to carry unused deductions over to the following year.
73
 
Code § 183 replaced a previous section that applied if an individual had 
trade or business losses over $50,000 for at least five consecutive years.
74
 
That section, termed the ―hobby loss‖ provision, limited the losses that could 
offset other income to $50,000 for each of those years.
75
 In 1969, Congress 
found that the previous hobby loss provision had been unsuccessful and that 
the approach used by some courts of disallowing losses as relating not to a 
trade or business but to a mere ―hobby‖ was more promising.76  
The 1969 House bill would have applied the proposed hobby loss 
provision to corporations as well as individuals.
77
 The Senate bill limited the 
provision to individuals ―since it is primarily in the case of individual 
taxpayers that the problem arises of a taxpayer entering into an activity to 
obtain a loss from the activity which is used to offset other income.‖78 
Not surprisingly, the primary use of the hobby loss provision has been to 
police the personal/profit-seeking boundary, typically by limiting deductions 
incurred in loss-producing hobbies, particularly of high-income individuals.
79
 
However, at one time, § 183 was also used as a tool to tackle the tax shelters 
of the 1970s and 1980s by treating shelters as activities not engaged in for 
profit and thus requiring basketing.
80
  
 
 
 72. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d) (2010) (―If the taxpayer engages in two or more separate 
activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining 
whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying section 183.‖). 
 73. See I.R.C. § 183. 
 74. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 71 (1969). Certain losses were disregarded for this 
purpose. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 104 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2133.  
 78. Id. The Report also stated that ―the application of the provision to corporations would present 
a number of difficulties, such as its effect on shared facilities provided on a cost basis.‖ Id. 
 79. See Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean 
& Mean What You Say, 66 MISS. L.J. 37, 115 (1996) (―[S]ection [183] was not designed to prevent tax 
sheltering, rather, its purpose when enacted was to distinguish between activities that were personal 
hobbies and those that were engaged in with the intent of making a profit.‖); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-
2(c) (2010) (illustrating § 183 through examples, including Example 1 (ownership of unprofitable farm 
by widow with substantial stock holdings ―could be found not to be engaged in for profit‖), Example 2 
(self-publication of philosophical ideas by wealthy stock owner could be found not to be profit 
motivated), Example 3 (loss-producing dog- and horse-breeding activities of successful soft drink 
retailer could be found not to be profit seeking), and Example 4 (farming activity of factory worker 
making $8,500 per year who does much of the farm work himself could be found to be engaged in for 
profit)). 
 80. See Calvin Johnson, What’s A Tax Shelter, 68 TAX NOTES 879, 882 (1995) (―The courts treat 
tax shelters as a branch of the section 183 hobby loss rules. Deductions from hobbies can be used only 
against income from other hobbies. In the Tax Court, a ‗generic‘ tax shelter is a ‗not-for-profit 
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5. Gambling Losses 
Code § 165 generally authorizes the deduction of uncompensated losses.
81
 
However, ―[l]osses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the 
extent of the gains from such transactions.‖82 The legislative history states 
that the reason for the provision was to stop the practice of reporting 
gambling losses without reporting gambling winnings as income.
83
 Professor 
Deborah Geier has argued that the limitation on gambling losses of § 165(d) 
is analogous to the hobby loss rules of § 183: 
The paradigm for both sections is that deductions will be allowed up 
to the amount of gross income, but no ―loss‖ (deductions in excess of 
gross income from the activity) will be allowed, which prevents the 
sheltering of unrelated gross income from tax. The underlying theory 
is that both activities are considered personal consumption activities, 
not investment or business activities.
84
 
Thus, § 165(d) targets personal activity, unlike several of the other 
basketing provisions. In that regard, it is like § 183; though, unlike § 183, it 
has not been used to combat tax shelters. In addition, § 165(d) allows losses 
from one type of gambling (such as playing craps at a casino) to offset wins 
from another type of gambling (such as betting on horse races).
85
 This avoids 
the question required under § 183 of whether these are one activity or two.
86
 
                                                                                                                         
 
activity.‘‖ (footnotes omitted)); see also Adam D. Chinn, Note, Attacking Tax Shelters: Section 183 
Leaves the Farm and Goes to the Movies, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 91–93 (1986). 
 81. See I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006). Section 165 does contain restrictions on the deductibility of some 
types of losses. For example, § 165(c) generally limits the deductibility of losses by individuals to 
losses incurred in a trade or business or profit-seeking activity or resulting from a casualty or theft. Id. 
§ 165(c). 
 82. Id. § 165(d). 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 22 (1934) (―Under the present law many taxpayers take deductions 
for gambling losses but fail to report gambling gains. This limitation will force taxpayers to report 
their gambling gains if they desire to deduct their gambling losses.‖); see also Boyd v. United States, 
762 F.2d 1369, 1374 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-704 (1934)). 
 84. Deborah A. Geier, Cheatin’ Artist Paints a Peculiar Picture, 96 TAX NOTES 1417, 1418 
(2002). 
 85. See 2007 Tax Mgmt. Portfolios: Loss Deductions (BNA), No. 527, at A-118 (―Wagering 
activities do not have to be segregated from each other. The combined wagering losses from all 
wagering transactions, regardless of type, may be used as an offset against the combined gains from all 
such transactions. In effect, this permits the net losses of unsuccessful wagering ventures to be offset 
against the net gains of those that prove to be profitable.‖). 
 86. In addition, as Professor Geier points out, § 183(b) deductions are subject to the ―two-percent 
floor‖ of Code § 67, while gambling losses are not. See Geier, supra note 84, at 1418. In this regard, as 
well as with respect to the breadth of the activities that can be grouped in one basket under § 165(d), 
the gambling loss limitation is more generous than the hobby loss provision. However, the latter 
provides a presumption that the activity is engaged in for profit (and thus not subject to a limitation) if 
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Each of these basketing provisions provides an example of an effort by 
Congress to restrict the deductibility of a particular type of expense or loss. In 
each case, the Code limits the deductibility of the expense or loss from an 
activity to the amount of income or gain from that activity (or all activities of 
the same general type). These limitations therefore reflect a congressional 
determination that it would be inappropriate for the taxpayer to deduct these 
expenses or losses from unrelated income. 
II. A PROPOSAL FOR DOMESTIC CORPORATE BASKETING 
Under current law, with limited exceptions, corporations can deduct all 
expenses and losses from all income, regardless of source.
87
 To the extent 
that losses exceed income, they can give rise to net operating losses that can 
be carried to other tax years to reduce tax liability for those years.
88
 A 
previous article has shown that individuals‘ investment and business 
activities are not treated similarly on the deduction side; instead, investment-
related deductions are subject to many more limitations.
89
 The same is not 
true for corporations. Instead, for corporations, even expenses and losses 
from portfolio investments are deductible from income from any source.  
Because (1) corporations do not face limitations on the deductibility of 
their investment interest under § 163(d) and (2) large corporations are not 
subject to the passive activity loss rules, a public corporation with a 
profitable business can invest passively in a tax strategy designed to give rise 
to tax losses used to offset business income. The basketing proposal 
discussed below generally would preclude that. 
A. The Proposal 
This Article proposes the creation of a single basket for corporations‘ 
passive expenses and losses—expenses and losses not incurred in connection 
with their business activities. The proposal would not be to basket ―tax 
shelter‖ items. That approach would require defining what a tax shelter is,90 a 
difficult and inefficient endeavor.
91
 Rather, the proposal would thus function 
                                                                                                                         
 
the activity is profitable for a certain period of time, generally three out of the last five years. See 
I.R.C. § 183(d) (2006). 
 87. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 165(a); cf. I.R.C. 165(c) (limiting individuals‘ loss deductions). 
 88. See id. § 172. 
 89. See Lederman, supra note 59, at 1410–35.  
 90. See U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, 
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 118–19 (1999) (―Limiting schedular taxation to corporate 
tax shelters would require a definition and identification of the offending transactions.‖).  
 91. See Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 (2010); cf. 
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somewhat like Code § 469, which successfully combated the tax shelters of 
the 1970s and 1980s without requiring a determination of whether the 
passive activity constituted a ―tax shelter.‖92 The passive items covered by 
the proposal would encompass capital gains and losses from the sale or 
exchange of investment assets, as discussed below. 
1. Threshold Applicability 
The proposed limitation on deductions would apply to C corporations that 
are not subject to specialized regimes. Thus, the proposed provision would 
exempt personal holding companies and other entities, such as insurance 
companies, that are subject to special tax treatment.
93
 Like the passive 
activity loss rules of § 469,
94
 losses disallowed under this provision would be 
carried over indefinitely and would be deductible from income of the same 
type. This would allow current recognition for accounting purposes of a 
future reduction in taxes due to a postponed deduction.
95
 It would lessen the 
impact of the current disallowance of the tax deduction by reducing tax 
liabilities for accounting purposes and thus not reducing reported earnings. 
However, the availability of an accounting benefit should not be enough to 
                                                                                                                         
 
Lee A. Sheppard, Is There Constructive Thinking About Corporate Tax Shelters?, 83 TAX NOTES 782, 
784 (1999) (―[A] schedular system would avoid the problem of having to define ‗corporate tax 
shelter.‘‖). ―The difficulty with defining shelters is that, like Justice Potter Stewart, we know them 
when we see them, but we apparently cannot agree either on what we are seeing or how to describe 
what we see.‖ Deborah H. Schenk, Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, Foreword, 55 TAX L. REV. 
125, 127 (2002) (footnote omitted); see Calvin H. Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 
879, 881–82 (1995). Each definition plausibly captures some manifestation of a tax shelter, but just as 
often leaves other manifestations out or brings legitimate tax planning into its fold.  
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59. 
 93. ―Special tax regimes often apply to corporations involved in banking, insurance, and the 
like.‖ Richard D. Pomp, State Corporate Income Taxes: The Illogical Deduction for Income Taxes 
Paid to Other States, 42 TAX L. REV. 419, 422 n.10 (1987). For example, Code § 1361 provides that 
the following types of corporations are ineligible to be S corporations: ―(A) a financial institution 
which uses the reserve method of accounting for bad debts described in section 585, (B) an insurance 
company subject to tax under subchapter L, (C) a corporation to which an election under section 936 
applies, or (D) a DISC or former DISC.‖ I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2). The proposal is designed to make 
minimal changes to existing law while still limiting corporate tax shelter activity through basketing. 
Accordingly, it could subsequently be tightened, such as by extending its applicability to a broader 
group of corporations. 
 94. See I.R.C. § 469(b) (generally allowing ―any loss or credit from an activity which is 
disallowed under subsection (a) . . . [to] be treated as a deduction or credit allocable to such activity in 
the next taxable year.‖). 
 95. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 109: ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES 5 (1992) (―A deferred tax asset is recognized 
for temporary differences that will result in deductible amounts in future years and for carryforwards. 
. . . [A] deferred tax asset is recognized in the current year for the reduction in taxes payable in future 
years.‖). 
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attract tax shelter investors in light of the disallowance of the tax benefits that 
are the primary appeal of tax shelters. 
Unlike the situation under § 469, losses disallowed by the proposed 
provision would not simply be deductible upon disposition of the item that 
gave rise to them.
96
 This is because the shelters addressed by § 469 generally 
allowed acceleration of deductions,
97
 while, as discussed below,
98
 corporate 
tax shelters generally create noneconomic losses (often by inflating assets‘ 
bases for federal income tax purposes). In the corporate tax shelter context, 
allowing the taxpayer to claim the disallowed deduction upon disposition 
would essentially permit the shelter to proceed unimpeded. 
To reduce complexity, corporations of a certain size should be exempted 
from utilizing the proposed provision, at least until there is some experience 
with it.
99
 To be clear, the exception should not be for passive items under a 
separate threshold, because then many corporations that ultimately would not 
be subject to the provisions would be required to track their passive items to 
see if they reach the threshold.
100
 Rather, the exception would relate to 
capitalization of the business.  
For example, the provision could use a definition similar to the definition 
of ―qualified small business‖ in Code § 1202(d).101 That section treats as a 
qualified small business a C corporation with aggregate gross assets of $50 
million or less.
102
 Because § 1202 determines whether stock issued by a 
corporation is ―qualified small business stock,‖ the measurement date is the 
 
 
 96. See I.R.C. § 469(g) (providing rules for disposition of passive activity, including full 
deductibility upon disposition in a taxable transaction). 
 97. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 
TAX L. REV. 137, 154 (2003) (Under § 469, ―[t]axpayers may use passive losses to offset ordinary 
nonpassive income, but only at the termination of the venture, thus removing the timing advantage that 
is key to traditional tax sheltering activity.‖). 
 98. See infra Part II.B. 
 99. A possible objection to the proposal based on its complexity is discussed further below. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 100. Similarly, the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions of I.R.C. § 67 in 
theory ―relieve[s] taxpayers of the burden of recordkeeping unless they expect to incur expenditures in 
excess of the floor.‖ STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 78 (Comm. Print 1987). However, in practice, taxpayers cannot be 
sure at the beginning of the year whether they will have miscellaneous itemized deductions in excess 
of the floor, so if they want to preserve the option of having the lowest tax liability, they do need to 
keep those records. See Sarah S. Batson, Note, Administrative Expenses of Trusts: What Did Congress 
Mean?, 59 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554 (2008) (―In order to reduce the record-keeping burden on taxpayers, 
Congress simply capped that deduction. This is no benefit to taxpayers who still have to keep records 
of deductible transactions in order to determine whether they exceed two percent of adjusted gross 
income and, if so, by how much.‖). 
 101. See I.R.C. § 1202(d). 
 102. Id. § 1202(d)(1)(B). 
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date of issuance of the stock.
103
 The corporate basketing proposal is not tied 
to an event such as issuance of stock, so it would have to use an arbitrary 
measurement date, such as the first day of the tax year.  
The provision should also employ a threshold designed with the context 
of the particular provision in mind, so it need not track Code § 1202. The 
threshold for applicability of the proposed provision should be set at least at 
the threshold at which a business falls within the Large Business and 
International Division of the IRS: gross assets over $10 million.
104
 That 
would mean that the Small Business/Self-Employed Division of the IRS
105
 
would not need to become familiar with the new provision.
106
 That is, the 
$10 million threshold would be more efficient than a lower one that required 
both IRS divisions to learn the new provision. Of course, the threshold could 
also be higher without raising this concern. However, the higher the 
threshold, the fewer corporations to which it would apply, so the threshold 
would need to be carefully determined to avoid excessively limiting the 
usefulness of the proposed provision.
107
 
2. Identifying Passive Items 
a. The Passive Activity Loss Rules and the Unrelated Business 
Income Tax 
Unlike individuals, corporations are not treated under the Code as having 
nonbusiness profit-seeking activity. That is, while individuals must 
 
 
 103. See id. § 1202(c)(1)(A). 
 104. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Realigns and Renames Large Business 
Division, Enhances Focus on International Tax Administration (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=226284,00.html. This division was previously the Large 
and Mid-Size Business Division. See id. 
 105. For an overview of IRS‘s Small Business/Self-Employed Division, see Small Business/Self-
Employed Division At-a-Glance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101001,00.html (last 
updated Aug. 19, 2010). 
 106. Given the cross-reference to Code § 954(c), the provision is a particularly good fit for the 
Large Business and International Division. See infra text accompanying notes 144–45.  
 107. The appropriate range would seem to be within $10 million of capital (the Large Business 
and International Division threshold) and $50 million of capital (the section 1202 threshold). Tax 
shelters are generally most useful to taxpayers with substantial income. However, during the heyday of 
the corporate tax shelter era, they were widely marketed: 
Evidence shows that KPMG compiled and scoured prospective client lists, pushed its personnel to 
meet sales targets, closely monitored their sales efforts, advised its professionals to use 
questionable sales techniques, and even used cold calls to drum up business. The evidence also 
shows that, at times, KPMG marketed tax shelters to persons who appeared to have little interest 
in them or did not understand what they were being sold, and likely would not have used them to 
reduce their taxes without being approached by KPMG. 
S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 33 (2005). 
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distinguish between trade or business and nontrade/nonbusiness activities in 
a number of contexts—with more favorable treatment accorded the former 
than the latter
108—corporations generally do not have to make this 
distinction.
109
  
However, there are contexts in which corporations of a specific type have 
to separate their passive and active items.
110
 For example, the passive activity 
loss rules of Code § 469, although not applicable to publicly held 
corporations,
111
 do apply to closely held C corporations and personal service 
corporations.
112
  
In addition, organizations subject to unrelated business income tax,
113
 
including not-for-profit corporations, are taxed at corporate rates on their 
unrelated business taxable income.
114
 However, that tax generally does not 
apply to many types of income that are generally considered passive,
115
 
including interest, dividends, royalties, and many rents.
116
 Thus, not-for-
profit corporations must distinguish passive and active income.  
 
 
 108. See Lederman, supra note 59, at 1425. 
 109. See STEPHEN A. LIND, STEPHEN SCHWARZ, DANIEL J. LATHROPE & JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (7th ed. 2008). There are 
exceptions, however. For example, for a distribution to qualify as a nonrecognition transaction under § 
355, ―the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation . . . [must be] engaged immediately 
after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business.‖ I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
Treasury Regulations under § 355 provide in part that ―[t]he active conduct of a trade or business does 
not include . . . [t]he holding for investment purposes of stock, securities, land, or other property.‖ 
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv)(A) (2010). 
 110. See Lee A. Sheppard, No Partnership in Boca Investerings Tax Shelter, 98 TAX NOTES 300, 
304 (2003) (proposing a ―scheduler system‖ employing a ―portfolio holdings‖ definition based on 
Code § 263 or §§ 871 and 881). 
 111. See I.R.C. § 469(a)(2) (applying § 469 to individuals, estates, trusts, closely held C 
corporations, and personal service corporations). 
 112. Id.  
 113. The organizations subject to unrelated business income tax at corporate rates are 
organizations described in §§ 401(a) and 501(c) and state colleges and universities. Id. § 511(a)(2). 
 114. See id. § 511(a)(1). 
 115. There is an exception providing that the unrelated business income tax does apply to passive 
income to the extent that the property producing it is debt financed. See id. §§ 512(b)(4), 514. 
 116. See id. § 514(b)(1)–(3); see also Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the 
History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1483 
(2005) (―[D]ividends, interest, loan proceeds, annuity payments, royalties, rents, capital gains, and 
certain other categories of ‗passive‘ income are specifically excluded from the [Unrelated Business 
Income Tax (UBIT)] tax.‖). The traditional explanation for the UBIT is to eliminate unfair 
competition. Id. at 1488–89. However, Professor Stone has proposed a more nuanced explanation of 
the exceptions from UBIT for passive income and income related to the charity‘s exempt purpose: 
 The UBIT was designed to channel charities away from problematic activities by setting up a 
tax gradient that favored income-generating activities compatible with perceptions of charitable 
activity. At the taxable end were highly visible activities that challenged perceptions of charitable 
activities—active business endeavors unrelated to any charitable purpose. Law schools that 
wanted to make Congress uncomfortable by running spaghetti and piston-ring factories would 
have to pay for the privilege. At the exempt end were activities more compatible with perceptions 
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These provisions reflect the reality that many corporations are not 
insulated from distinguishing passive and active items. However, § 469 and 
the unrelated business income tax do not provide a passive/active distinction 
that is as suitable for the basketing context as Code § 954(c) does. As 
discussed below, the § 954(c) definition is already applicable to multinational 
corporations in three distinct contexts. 
b. Section 954(c) 
Multinational corporations are required to identify their passive-source 
items for purposes of Subpart F of the Code, the Passive Foreign Investment 
Company (PFIC) regime, and the foreign tax credit.
117
 All of those 
provisions, which are discussed in turn below, rely on the list in Code 
§ 954(c) (the definition of foreign personal holding company income).
118
  
Subpart F is an antideferral regime. Generally, shareholders in C 
corporations are not taxed on corporate earnings until those earnings are 
distributed as dividends.
119
 Subpart F is an exception to that general rule. 
Under Subpart F, U.S. shareholders of controlled foreign corporations 
(CFCs) generally are subject to current federal income taxation to the extent 
the CFC earns certain disfavored types of income, including passive 
income.
120
 A CFC is a foreign corporation in which more than 50% of the 
total value or total combined voting power is held, directly or indirectly, by 
U.S. shareholders.
121
 A U.S. shareholder is a ―U.S. person‖122 who owns at 
least 10% of the total combined voting power in the corporation, directly or 
indirectly.
123
 Passive income includes foreign personal holding company 
income, which is defined in § 954(c).
124
  
                                                                                                                         
 
of charitable activity—traditional, passive investment and active business endeavors related to 
accomplishing a charitable objective. Charities willing to ―adhere to the old line‖ of good works 
and passive investment were rewarded. 
Id. at 1554. 
 117. See infra text accompanying notes 119–42. 
 118. See I.R.C. § 1297(b)(1). 
 119. See id. § 61(a)(7); Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened To Subpart F? U.S. CFC 
Legislation after the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 185, 186 (2005). 
 120. See Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck 
in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2001).  
 121. I.R.C. §§ 957(a), 958(b).  
 122. A U.S. person generally is any citizen or resident of the United States, a domestic 
partnership, a domestic corporation, or a domestic estate or trust. Id. § 7701(a)(30). 
 123. Id. § 951(b); see also id. § 958. 
 124. See id. § 954(a), (c). 
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The PFIC regime,
125
 enacted in 1986, was designed to limit the use of 
foreign corporations as a mechanism for reducing taxes on portfolio 
investments.
126
 A foreign corporation constitutes a PFIC if 75% or more of 
its gross income is passive or more than 50% of its assets (by value) produce 
passive income,
 127
 as defined in § 954(c).
128
 If a corporation is a PFIC that is 
not a ―qualified electing fund‖ (QEF) during one tax year, it generally will 
constitute a PFIC for all future tax years.
129
 In general, a QEF is a PFIC that 
complies with certain IRS requirements with respect to which the taxpayer 
has made an election.
130
 
Any U.S. person who holds PFIC shares directly or indirectly
131
 is subject 
to the antideferral rules of the PFIC regime. If the PFIC constitutes a QEF, 
then the shareholder generally is taxed on a current basis (as a constructive 
dividend) on his or her pro rata share of the PFIC‘s ordinary earnings, 
constructive distributions from earnings invested in U.S. property,
132
 and net 
long-term capital gain.
133
 If the PFIC is not a QEF, the shareholder must 
calculate the tax on any ―excess distribution‖134 or gain on disposition of the 
PFIC shares.
135
  
 
 
 125. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1235(a), 100 Stat. 2566, 2566 (1986). 
 126. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1023 (Comm. Print 1987). 
 127. I.R.C. § 1297(a).  
 128. Id. § 1297(b)(1).  
 129. See id. § 1298(b)(1). This provision provides an exception that applies ―if the taxpayer elects 
to recognize gain (as of the last day of the last taxable year for which the company was a passive 
foreign investment company (determined without regard to the preceding sentence)) under rules 
similar to the rules of section 1291(d)(2).‖ Id. 
 130. See id. § 1295(a)(2) (requiring electing PFIC to ―compl[y] with such requirements as the 
Secretary may prescribe for purposes of—(A) determining the ordinary earnings and net capital gain 
of such company, and (B) otherwise carrying out the purposes of this subpart.‖). 
 131. See Treatment of Shareholders of Certain Passive Foreign Investment Companies, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 11,024, 11,034 (Apr. 1, 1992) (codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602).  
 132. I.R.C. § 1298(b)(9) (cross-referencing Code § 951(a)(1)(B)). 
 133. The net long-term capital gain is taken into the shareholder‘s income as a capital gain, while 
the other items of income are ordinary income in the hands of the shareholder. Id. § 1293(a)(1)(B); 
Treatment of Shareholders of Certain Passive Foreign Investment Companies, 57 Fed. Reg. at 11,033. 
 134. I.R.C. § 1291(a). An excess distribution is ―any distribution in respect of stock received 
during any taxable year to the extent such distribution does not exceed its ratable portion of the total 
excess distribution (if any) for such taxable year.‖ Id. § 1291(b)(1).  
 135. Id. § 1291(a)(2) (―If the taxpayer disposes of stock in a passive foreign investment company, 
then the rules of paragraph (1) shall apply to any gain recognized on such disposition in the same 
manner as if such gain were an excess distribution.‖).  
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The foreign tax credit also relies on § 954(c).
136
 Under this regime, U.S. 
taxpayers are allowed to claim a credit for foreign income taxes paid.
137
 One 
article explains: 
Section 904(a) contains an ―overall limitation‖ intended to prevent a 
U.S. taxpayer from using foreign tax credits to reduce its U.S. tax 
liability on U.S.-source income. Section 904(a) seeks to achieve this 
goal by capping the credit at the amount of U.S. tax a U.S. taxpayer 
would have paid on foreign-source income.
138
  
Since 2007,
139
 the foreign tax credit has had two baskets for this purpose, 
general income and passive income.
140
 This ―prevent[s] the excess foreign 
tax credits from one basket of foreign-source taxable income from being 
offset (cross credited) against the U.S. residual tax liability on low-taxed 
foreign-source taxable income in the other basket.‖141 As indicated above, the 
foreign tax credit relies on § 954(c) for the definition of passive income.
142
 
Thus, three different provisions require multinational corporations to 
separate passive and active income. All three provisions rely on the definition 
of passive income in § 954(c).
143
 Section 954(c) includes ―[d]ividends, 
interest, royalties, rents, and annuities,‖144 except royalties and rents from an 
active business received from someone other than a related person.
145
 These 
items exemplify passive items. It further includes certain other types of 
income, including income from commodities transactions, foreign currency 
gains, and notional principal contracts, as well as payments that are the 
equivalent of interest or dividends.
146
 
 
 
 136. See id. § 904(d)(2)(B)(i). The foreign tax credit rules do reflect certain variants on this 
definition. See id. § 904(d)(2)(B).  
 137. See id. § 901. 
 138. Wright Schickli, Equipment Fee Clauses in U.S. Tax Treaties: The Unmolded Progeny of 
Madame Tussaud?, 59 TAX LAW. 419, 439–40 (2006).  
 139. See Randall Jackson, IRS Clarifies Foreign Tax Credit Limitations, 118 TAX NOTES 114, 114 
(2008) (―Changes to the law were made by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, reducing the 
number of section 904(d) baskets from eight to two, effective for tax years beginning after December 
31, 2006.‖). 
 140. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1). 
 141. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its 
International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 542 (2008). This approach does not restrict cross-
crediting across jurisdictions. See Timothy A. Rybacki, Comment, Separation Anxiety: The 
Repatriation of Foreign Tax Credits Without Associated Income via the Technical Taxpayer Rule’s 
Joint and Several Liability Provision, 19 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 1575, 1583–84 (2005). 
 142. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 143. I.R.C. § 954(c). 
 144. Id. § 954(c)(1)(A). 
 145. Id. § 954(c)(2)(A). 
 146. Id. § 954(c)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(a)(4)(i) (2010). However, it does not include 
commodity hedges related to the taxpayer‘s business. See infra text accompanying notes 281–84. 
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Section 954(c) also includes gain from the disposition of an asset that 
gave rise to any of those types of income or did not generate any income.
147
 
That generally would include gain on the sale of stock, bonds, rental real 
estate, and the like. In addition, § 954(c) encompasses gain from the 
disposition of ―an interest in a trust, partnership, or REMIC [Real Estate 
Mortgage Investment Conduit].‖148  
 c. Applying the § 954(c) Definition 
As the discussion just above has shown, Code § 954(c) provides a 
detailed list of the types of income that are considered passive for the foreign 
personal holding company rules and are used by multinational corporations 
for several purposes. The basketing proposal advanced by this Article is for 
expenses and losses relating to any of these types of items to be basketed 
with aggregate income from these sources, so that any deduction for passive 
expenses and losses would be capped by the taxpayer‘s passive income for 
the year.  
Thus, the taxpayer would basket with the income items listed in § 954(c) 
any otherwise allowable expenses, losses, and credits attributable to items of 
those types. For example, if the taxpayer had interest and dividend income 
and a loss on rental real estate, it would basket those three items, so that the 
otherwise allowable loss for the year would be limited to the amount of 
passive income for the year. 
Under this proposal, sales of stock would generally result in basketing of 
gains and losses.
149
 Gains and losses on the sale of subsidiaries may warrant 
an exception, however. Section 954(c) contains look-through rules for certain 
partnership sales
150
 and for CFCs that are treated as related to the taxpayer,
151
 
but those provisions are not directly applicable to the question of the sale of a 
subsidiary corporation. The proposed provision could provide that if the 
taxpayer owns a certain percentage of a corporation—for example, at least 
25%, by vote or by value immediately prior to the sale in question, perhaps 
considering constructive ownership under § 318
152—then whether gain or 
loss on a disposition of stock in that corporation is considered active would 
 
 
 147. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(B)(i), (iii).  
 148. Id. § 954(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
 149. Basketing would be done for gains and losses remaining after other rules, such as the capital 
loss limitations, are applied. See infra text accompanying notes 155–58.  
 150. I.R.C. § 954(c)(4). 
 151. Id. § 954(c)(6). 
 152. See id. § 318(a) (indicating that stock owned by parties related to the taxpayer within the 
meaning of Code § 318 is considered owned by the taxpayer). 
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depend on the nature of the corporation‘s income over a period of time, such 
as the preceding three years. If 25% or more of the subsidiary‘s income 
during each of those years (or its entire existence, if less) consisted of income 
of the types provided in § 954(c), a gain or loss on the sale of the subsidiary 
would be basketed with the taxpayer‘s other passive items.153  
Such a rule would appropriately keep losses on the sale of active 
subsidiaries active and thus not subject to basketing. In theory, corporations 
might manipulate the rule to create passive gains for basketing purposes, but 
that would require substantial passive income for an extended period of 
time.
154
 Corporations could also implicitly elect into or out of this rule by 
acquiring or disposing of stock in order to obtain or fall below the statutory 
threshold. Stock acquisition has costs, of course, and disposition of stock has 
tax consequences. 
Although, as this discussion suggests, § 954(c) is complex, it has the 
virtue of already being applied by multinational corporations in several 
contexts. As discussed below, by relying on an existing definitional section, 
and one already used for other purposes by a subset of corporations, the 
proposal would add the minimal amount of complexity necessary to achieve 
its goals. 
3. Ordering Rules 
The proposed basketing provision would apply after other Code 
provisions.
155
 Thus, only includible income and authorized expenses, losses, 
and credits would be basketed.
156
 In addition, the proposed provision would 
apply after other limitation provisions. For example, if a corporate taxpayer 
had a capital gain of $2 million and a capital loss of $3 million, $1 million of 
 
 
 153. Similar rules could also apply to sales of interests in partnerships and limited liability 
companies. 
 154. That income might also subject the subsidiary to rules such as the PFIC regime (the 
antideferral regime discussed in supra text accompanying notes 125–35).  
 155. Like other statutes, the proposed provision would apply before judicial doctrines such as the 
step-transaction doctrine. See Lederman, supra note 91, at 418 n.150  (―The results when the 
[economic substance] doctrine is applied to [a] hypothetical tax evading retailer—good arguments that 
the tax evasion has both a business purpose and economic substance—support the argument that the 
. . . doctrine should not be applied without first ascertaining that the transaction technically ‗works‘ 
under existing statutes and interpretive guidance.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 156. To basket credits with income and deductions, credits would be converted into their 
deduction equivalent. Given a top marginal corporate tax rate of 35%, see I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D), a 
credit, which reduces taxes dollar for dollar, would need to be divided by .35 (35%) to produce the 
equivalent deduction. For example, at a 35% tax rate, a $100 credit (which reduces tax liability by 
$100) is equivalent to a deduction of $285.71. Code § 108(b)(3)(B) provides an analogy: in reducing 
tax attributes to reflect excluded income, it reduces credits only by 33 1/3 cents per dollar. See id. 
§ 108(b)(3)(B). A 33 1/3 cent credit would offset income of $1 at a 33.33% tax rate.  
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the capital loss would be disallowed under the existing limitation on capital 
losses of § 1211.
157
 Thus, as under current law, the taxpayer would not be 
allowed to deduct the full $3 million of capital losses for the year even if the 
taxpayer had $1 million of another type of passive income, such as interest. 
In addition, the $2 million of capital loss that is not disallowed under § 
1211 would be subject to disallowance under the proposed provision. That is, 
if the loss derived from the sale of an asset that generated dividends, interest, 
royalties, rents, or annuity income—or no income at all158—it would be 
basketed with the taxpayer‘s passive income for the year. If the $2 million 
capital gain was from a passive source, or the taxpayer had other passive-
source income of at least $2 million, the proposed provision would not 
disallow the capital loss deduction. 
Similarly, the dividends received deduction, which allows corporate 
taxpayers a deduction for dividends received from other corporations,
159
 
along with limitations on the dividends received deduction,
160
 would apply 
before the proposed provision. Thus, the proposal would not eliminate any 
dividends received deduction otherwise available to a corporation. However, 
only the taxed portion of the dividend would constitute passive income for 
basketing purposes under the proposal.
161
 
B. Limiting Passive Deductions: Effects on Tax Shelters  
The goal of the proposal to basket corporations‘ domestic items is to limit 
opportunities for corporations to invest in abusive tax shelters.
162
 Although 
corporate tax shelters might be designed to comprise part of an active 
business, more typically they are designed as an investment in securities.
163
 
For example, the Contingent Installment Sale (CINS) transaction litigated in 
the well-known case of ACM Partnership v. Commissioner
164
 involved an 
 
 
 157. See I.R.C. § 1211(a). 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 144–48. 
 159. See I.R.C. § 243. 
 160. See id. § 246; cf. id. § 1059 (basis reduction for nontaxed portion of extraordinary dividends 
received). 
 161. As discussed below, the proposal would also encompass amendments to Code §§ 382 and 
384 to limit the ability of profitable corporations to acquire excess passive losses of other corporations. 
See infra text accompanying notes 268–69. 
 162. See Barker, supra note 25, at 25 (―[S]chedular principles have been introduced in the United 
States in an attempt to cure perceived abuse and to ensure the integrity of the system.‖). 
 163. See Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177, 192 (2001) (―([It] seems likely [that]) most income to be sheltered is 
from active businesses, and . . . ([it] also seems likely [that]) active business shelters are much harder 
to design than portfolio shelters . . . .‖); see also infra notes 270–74. 
 164. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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investment through a partnership in floating rate Citicorp notes.
165
 The FLIP 
(Foreign Leveraged Investment Program)/ OPIS (Offshore Portfolio 
Investment Strategy) transactions involved investment through a partnership 
or corporation in shares of UBS or another foreign bank.
166
  
These and four other tax shelters are discussed below, to illustrate how 
they work and the effects the proposed provision would have. For ease of 
understanding, the Article groups them into categories. The first category, 
loss-generating inflated-basis shelters, includes four tax shelters of two 
different general types. The second category focuses on a distinct type of 
shelter, which does not involve a loss generated for tax purposes, but rather 
involves a credit, the foreign tax credit. Like the four inflated-basis shelters, 
however, it involves a passive investment that would be targeted by the 
proposed provision. Finally, this Section discusses a third category of tax 
strategy: those incorporated into a taxpayer‘s active business. The proposal 
would not effectively target those strategies, but, as discussed below, those 
strategies are harder to replicate and thus pose less of a threat to the federal 
fisc. 
1. Inflated-Basis Strategies 
A number of corporate tax shelters involve claiming a tax basis that 
exceeds economic investment in an asset—typically stock or another 
security—in order to claim a loss for tax purposes once it is sold at its fair 
market value.
167
 Some strategies involve an attempt to ―shift‖ tax basis in 
such a way that the U.S. taxpayer investing in the shelter obtains basis from 
an accommodating nonresident alien who is not subject to federal income 
tax. The CINS and FLIP/OPIS shelters provide examples that are discussed 
immediately below. Other strategies involve the transfer of an asset along 
with an offsetting liability, coupled with a claim that the asset increases tax 
basis while the liability does not reduce it. The contingent liability and Son-
of-BOSS shelters fit this paradigm and are discussed further below.
168
 
 
 
 165. Id. at 239. 
 166. See Calvin H. Johnson, Tales from the KPMG Skunk Works: The Basis-Shift or Defective-
Redemption Shelter, 108 TAX NOTES 431, 433–34 (2005). 
 167. Under Code § 1001, the amount of a realized loss is the amount by which the taxpayer‘s 
basis in the asset exceeds the ―amount realized,‖ which, in a sale for cash, is the amount of money 
received. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b) (2006). 
 168. See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
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a. Basis-Shifting Strategies 
 i. Basis Shifting Across Time: CINS (ACM Partnership) 
The infamous ACM Partnership case involves basis shifting across time. 
In that case, the Colgate-Palmolive Company (Colgate) sold a subsidiary at a 
gain and subsequently engaged in a transaction promoted by Merrill Lynch 
& Co., Inc. designed to offset that gain with a tax loss.
169
 The transaction, 
called ―CINS,‖170 involved an investment through a partnership in illiquid 
securities—floating rate Citicorp notes.171 The partnership sold most of the 
Citicorp notes and received in return $140 million in cash plus approximately 
$35.5 million worth of notes that had no stated principal amount but provided 
for twenty quarterly payments based on the London Interbank Offering Rate 
(LIBOR).
172
  
Due to the periodic and uncertain payments under the LIBOR notes, the 
partnership treated the exchange as an installment sale without a maximum 
selling price.
173
 It therefore took advantage of temporary regulations under 
Code § 453, which applied the installment sale rules to contingent payments 
and allowed the taxpayer‘s basis to be allocated across the payments.174 
Because the payments spanned six years, the partnership allocated one-sixth 
of its approximately $175 million basis to the cash payment it received.
175
 
Accordingly, it recognized in the first year a large gain reflecting the 
difference between $140 million of cash received and the basis of 
approximately $29.3 million.
176
 The remaining five-sixths of the 
partnership‘s basis was allocated to the LIBOR notes, which, as indicated 
above, were worth only approximately $35.5 million.
177
 When those notes 
were subsequently sold, they therefore produced a large tax loss.
178
 
 
 
 169. See ACM, 157 F.3d at 233. 
 170. See I.R.S. Notice CC-2005-001 (Nov. 29, 2004). The IRS defines ―CINS‖ as Contingent 
Installment Note Sales. See id. 
 171. ACM, 157 F.3d at 238–40.  
 172. Id. at 240. 
 173. Id. at 242. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. (―ACM divided its $175,504,564 basis in the Citicorp notes, consisting of their $175 
million purchase price and $504,564 of accrued payable interest, equally among the six years over 
which payments were to be received in exchange for those notes, and thus recovered one sixth of that 
basis, or $29,250,761, during 1989. Subtracting this basis from the $140 million in cash consideration 
for the Citicorp notes, ACM reported a 1989 capital gain of $110,749,239.42 . . . .‖). 
 177. Id. at 246 n.27. 
 178. Id. at 243–44 (footnote omitted) (―For its tax year ended December 31, 1991, ACM reported 
a capital loss of $84,997,111 from its December 17, 1991 sale of the . . . LIBOR notes. This loss 
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The tax gain in the early year and tax loss in the later year were offsetting 
and did not reflect economic gains and losses.
179
 Rather, they reflected an 
allocation of a small fraction of basis to the first sale (producing a large gain) 
and a large fraction of basis to the second sale (producing a large loss).
180
 
The gains and losses were allocated to the partners in proportion to their 
partnership interests.
181
 The trick to the shelter was that in the year of the first 
sale, a Netherlands Antilles corporation, which was not subject to U.S. tax, 
had an 82.6% interest in the partnership and therefore was allocated most of 
the gain.
182
 The partnership interest of the Netherlands Antilles corporation 
was later redeemed so that, in the year of the second sale, the U.S. taxpayer, 
Colgate, was allocated virtually all of the tax loss.
183
 Colgate carried the loss 
back to the tax year in which it had a large capital gain from the sale of its 
subsidiary.
184
 
The ACM transaction was thus designed to allow a loss on a portfolio 
investment to offset a gain on the sale of an active business. As tax 
commentator Lee Sheppard has noted: ―Putting corporations on a schedular 
system, as the passive loss limitation rules do for individuals, clearly would 
have prevented situations like ACM, in which the taxpayer used artificial 
losses from a portfolio transaction to offset capital gain incurred on the sale 
of one of its operating businesses.‖185 
 ii. Basis Shifting Between Parties: FLIP/OPIS 
The tax strategies that the accounting firm KPMG marketed under the 
acronyms FLIP and OPIS attempt to shift basis between parties.
186
 They 
involve corporate stock redemptions (buybacks) designed to fail to qualify as 
sales for federal income tax purposes.
187
 In general, corporate redemptions of 
stock resemble both sales, because the shareholder is selling stock, and 
dividend-type distributions,
188
 because the corporation is distributing cash or 
                                                                                                                         
 
consisted of the difference between the $10,961,581 that ACM received for those notes and the 
remaining $95,958,692 basis in those notes.‖). 
 179. Id. at 252.  
 180. See id. at 243–46. 
 181. Id. at 242. 
 182. Id. at 239–43. 
 183. Id. at 244.  
 184. Id. at 243–44.  
 185. Sheppard, supra note 91, at 784.  
 186. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 433. 
 187. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.  
 188. A dividend-type distribution is a distribution to a shareholder governed by Code § 301; it is 
taxed as a dividend to the extent of the corporation‘s earnings and profits. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 
316(a) (2006). 
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other property to the shareholder in the shareholder‘s capacity as such. Code 
§ 302 therefore provides a series of resemblance tests to determine in which 
category a particular redemption will be deemed to belong for tax 
purposes.
189
 The shareholder-level tests generally treat more substantial 
decreases in stock ownership as sales and less significant ones as dividend-
type distributions.
190
 The tests take into account constructive ownership of 
stock
191
 under attribution rules that encompass stock owned by related 
parties.
192
  
If the redemption is treated as a sale, the taxpayer recovers tax basis in the 
computation of gain for tax purposes just as in any other sale.
193
 However, in 
a dividend-type distribution, basis is not recovered first.
194
 That presents the 
question of what happens to the taxpayer‘s tax basis in the redeemed shares. 
A Treasury regulation provided that ―proper adjustment of the basis of the 
remaining stock will be made with respect to the stock redeemed.‖195 An 
example involving two owners (a husband and wife) provided that when all 
of the husband‘s shares were redeemed, the wife—whose ownership caused 
the redemption of the husband‘s stock not to qualify as a sale196—was 
allocated the basis.
197
 
The FLIP/OPIS shelter took advantage of this ―shifting basis‖ notion. Its 
general structure was that a corporation was incorporated offshore and 
bought shares in an accommodating foreign bank, such as UBS.
198
 The U.S. 
taxpayer acquired options to buy stock in the offshore corporation sufficient 
for the taxpayer to be related to that corporation within the constructive 
 
 
 189. See id. § 302(a) (―If a corporation redeems its stock . . . and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) 
of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in 
exchange for the stock.‖); id. § 302(b) (providing four circumstances under which a redemption will be 
treated as an exchange (that is, a sale)); id. § 302(d) (―Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, 
if a corporation redeems its stock . . . and if subsection (a) of this section does not apply, such 
redemption shall be treated as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.‖). 
 190. See id. § 302(b)(1)–(3) (treating as exchanges redemptions that are ―not essentially 
equivalent to a dividend,‖ are substantially disproportionate, or are complete terminations of 
shareholder‘s interest). 
 191. See id. § 302(c). 
 192. See id. § 318. 
 193. See id. § 1001(a). For example, if a taxpayer receives $100,000 of dividend proceeds in a 
redemption taxed as a sale/exchange and the taxpayer has a basis of $80,000 in the redeemed shares, 
the taxpayer has $20,000 of gain ($100,000–$80,000) that is included in gross income. 
 194. See id. § 301(c) (taxing dividend amount before basis is recovered). 
 195. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (2010). 
 196. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (―An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned, 
directly or indirectly, by or for . . . his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated from the 
individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance) . . . .‖). 
 197. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) Ex. 2.  
 198. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 434. 
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ownership rules of § 318.
199
 The U.S. taxpayer also purchased a small 
number of shares in UBS.
200
 Professor Calvin Johnson has explained the next 
steps in the strategy: 
 Just as Cayman [the offshore corporation] was redeemed out of 
UBS, the American purchasers bought an option, under the package, 
to buy the same number of UBS shares . . . that Cayman was 
redeemed out of. Because optioned stock is considered to be 
constructively owned, without regard to whether exercise of the option 
was a realistic prospect or not, and because Cayman owned everything 
Taxpayer owned, Cayman was not completely redeemed out under 
section 302. Indeed, Cayman had no reduction of its ownership of 
UBS once constructive ownership was considered.
201
 
Relying on Treasury Regulation section 1.302-2(c), the taxpayer would 
claim the basis in the UBS stock that was unused by the foreign corporation 
because the redemption was treated as a dividend shifted to the U.S. 
taxpayer.
202
 The U.S. taxpayer then had a very high basis in the shares of 
UBS stock it owned, resulting in a large tax loss when it sold its small stake 
in UBS.
203
 
This shelter, like CINS, relies on the purchase of securities.
204
 It would 
thus be targeted by the proposed provision, which would have basketed the 
claimed tax loss only with passive income. That is, the taxpayer would not 
have been able to use the claimed loss to offset gain on the sale of an active 
business. 
b. Strategies Involving Offsetting Transfers 
As indicated above, another way to claim inflated basis besides shifting 
basis from one tax year to another or from one taxpayer to another is to 
transfer a pair of offsetting items to a corporation or partnership and claim 
 
 
 199. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 318(a)(4) (―If any person has an option to acquire stock, such stock 
shall be considered as owned by such person.‖). 
 200. Johnson, supra note 166, at 434. 
 201. Id. at 435. 
 202. See id. Note that the offshore corporation was not subject to U.S. tax, so it was not actually 
taxed on the redemption. 
 203. See id. 
 204. This shelter is also something of a throwback to the shelters of the 1970s and 1980s in that it 
depends on seller financing. See Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a 
Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263, 265 (1994) (arguing that both the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 included provisions designed to combat 
debt-financed tax shelters). The purchase of the shares probably would not have been financed by an 
outside lender; the funds never actually left UBS. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 435. 
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that the asset increases basis while the liability does not decrease basis. The 
contingent liability shelter exemplified by Black & Decker Corp. v. United 
States
205
 and the Son-of-BOSS transaction illustrate this approach. 
 i. Contingent Liabilities 
The Black & Decker case is a prime example of a contingent liability 
shelter. In that case, Black & Decker Corporation (B & D) had sold three 
businesses for substantial profits. To shelter the resulting capital gains, it 
proceeded as follows: 
B & D created Black & Decker Healthcare Management Inc. 
(―BDHMI‖). B & D transferred approximately $561 million dollars to 
BDHMI along with $560 million dollars in contingent employee 
healthcare claims in exchange for newly issued stock in BDHMI (―the 
BDHMI transaction‖). B & D sold its stock in BDHMI to an 
independent third-party for $1 million dollars.
206
 
Thus, B & D sold the stock in its new subsidiary for its fair value of $1 
million, the net amount invested in it. However, it claimed a $561 million 
basis in the stock and thus a $560 million loss on the sale.
207
  
The argument for the $561 million basis was that stock basis was not 
reduced by the $560 million dollars in contingent liabilities because it was a 
liability covered by Code § 357(c)(3),
208
 a provision that excludes from the 
general rule of § 357 liabilities that give rise to a deduction.
209
 Code § 358 
reduces tax basis for liabilities but contains an exception for liabilities 
excluded under § 357(c)(3).
210
 
 
 
 205. 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006).   
 206. Id. at 622. 
 207. Id.  
B&D thus obtained the equivalent of an immediate deduction for healthcare expenses that would 
not accrue until 1999–2007. BDHMI [the subsidiary] may stand to obtain a second deduction 
when (and if) the future healthcare claims are eventually paid on behalf of B&D‘s employees, 
even though BDHMI acquired neither the employees nor the underlying assets of the business that 
gave rise to the contingent liability.  
Karen C. Burke, Deconstructing Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability Shelter: A Statutory Analysis, 
108 TAX NOTES 211, 212 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
 208. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, [2004] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,359 
(D. Md. 2004).  
 209. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006). 
 210. See id. § 358(d). Congress subsequently responded to the contingent liability shelter by 
enacting § 358(h), which provides for a basis reduction for certain liabilities that did not otherwise 
reduce basis under § 358(d). See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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Revenue Ruling 95-74, a taxpayer-favorable ruling, had applied Code § 
357(c)(3) to contingent environmental liabilities, including those that could 
not be immediately deducted but rather had to be capitalized.
211
 However, in 
that ruling, the facts were that the taxpayer corporation, for bona fide 
business reasons,
212
 ―transferr[ed] substantially all of the assets associated 
with the Manufacturing Business, including the manufacturing plant and the 
land on which the plant is located,‖ to the new corporation, along with the 
liabilities of that business.
213
  
If B & D similarly had transferred a line of business to its new subsidiary, 
that would have been very close to the facts of the Revenue Ruling, and the 
IRS probably would not have challenged the transaction. Even the statutory 
change made by Congress in response to this shelter, which provides for a 
basis reduction for certain liabilities that did not otherwise reduce basis under 
§ 358(d),
214
 contains an exception where either: 
 (A) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is 
transferred to the person assuming the liability as part of the exchange, 
or 
 (B) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is 
associated are transferred to the person assuming the liability as part of 
the exchange.
215
 
 B & D might very well have been unwilling to sell off an active 
business or business assets. Instead, B & D transferred liabilities to a new 
subsidiary without accompanying business assets and therefore sold a 
subsidiary that was not engaged in an active business.
216
 ―B&D used the 
 
 
 211. See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 37. Code § 263 prohibits a deduction for capital 
expenditures, which generally consists of expenditures that give rise to benefits that extend 
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year or twelve-month period. See I.R.C. § 263(a); Jack‘s 
Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 402–03 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussing ―one-year rule‖); 
Blasius v. Comm‘r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 274, 277 (2005) (discussing ―12-month rule‖); see also Treas. 
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f) (2010) (providing a twelve-month rule for intangibles). 
 212. Rev. Rul. 95-74, at 36.  
 213. Id. 
 214. See I.R.C. § 358(h). That subsection provides, in part: 
 If, after application of the other provisions of this section to an exchange or series of 
exchanges, the basis of property to which subsection (a)(1) applies exceeds the fair market value 
of such property, then such basis shall be reduced (but not below such fair market value) by the 
amount (determined as of the date of the exchange) of any liability— 
 (A) which is assumed by another person as part of the exchange, and 
 (B) with respect to which subsection (d)(1) does not apply to the assumption. 
Id. § 358(h)(1). 
 215. Id. § 358(h)(2) (2006). 
 216. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (―Taxpayer only 
transferred the health claims but not the assets generating those claims . . . .‖).  
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claimed tax loss to offset tax gains from a prior sale of three of its businesses. 
The . . . transaction represented a ‗tax strategy‘ that the Deloitte accounting 
firm designed and promoted to some 30 corporate clients, including 
B&D.‖217 
Note that the strategy in contingent liability cases such as Black & Decker 
involved the sale of stock in a subsidiary.
218
 However, the subsidiary was not 
running a business.
219
 The loss on the sale of the subsidiary would thus be 
considered passive under the proposed provision as well. Accordingly, the 
proposed provision, had it applied, would have barred the use of the loss to 
offset gains on the sale of Black & Decker‘s active businesses. 
 ii. Son-of-BOSS 
―Son-of-BOSS is a variation of a slightly older alleged tax shelter known 
as BOSS, an acronym for ‗bond and options sales strategy.‘‖220 
Conceptually, Son-of-BOSS is similar to the contingent liability shelter 
described above because it relies on a claim that liabilities are uncertain and 
therefore do not reduce the basis in the entity to which they were 
transferred.
221
 The Son-of-BOSS label is applied to more than one type of 
transaction, but they all involve transactions designed to produce high basis 
in partnership interests so as to give rise to a large loss on sale.
222
 In Son-of-
BOSS, the mechanism for obtaining the high basis typically is the transfer of 
assets and liabilities to a partnership.
223
 For example, one variant is as 
follows: 
[A] taxpayer purchases and writes options and purports to create 
substantial positive basis in a partnership interest by transferring those 
option positions to a partnership. For example, a taxpayer might 
 
 
 217. Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit: Tax Shelters and Textualism, 111 
TAX NOTES 315, 316 (2006). 
 218. Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 432; see also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 
1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 219. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed 
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 745–46 (―The taxpayers . . . transferred over liabilities 
severed from their businesses (naked liabilities) to generate capital losses from the sale of the Newco 
stocks.‖). 
 220. Kligfeld Holdings v. Comm‘r, 128 T.C. 192, 194 (2007). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax 
Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 62, 64 n.20 (2008) (Son-of-BOSS variants include Currency Options Bring 
Reward Alternatives (COBRA), Option Partnership Strategy (OPS), and Short Option Strategy 
(SOS)); see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (describing Son-of-BOSS variations). 
 223. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 222, at 64; see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 
255, 255. 
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purchase call options for a cost of $1,000X and simultaneously write 
offsetting call options, with a slightly higher strike price but the same 
expiration date, for a premium of slightly less than $1,000X. Those 
option positions are then transferred to a partnership which, using 
additional amounts contributed to the partnership, may engage in 
investment activities. 
 Under the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement, 
the taxpayer claims that the basis in the taxpayer‘s partnership interest 
is increased by the cost of the purchased call options but is not reduced 
under § 752 as a result of the partnership‘s assumption of the 
taxpayer‘s obligation with respect to the written call options. 
Therefore, disregarding additional amounts contributed to the 
partnership, transaction costs, and any income realized and expenses 
incurred at the partnership level, the taxpayer purports to have a basis 
in the partnership interest equal to the cost of the purchased call 
options ($1,000X in this example), even though the taxpayer‘s net 
economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and the value of the 
partnership interest are nominal or zero.
224
 
The taxpayer then disposes of the partnership interest, and because the 
taxpayer claims basis far in excess of the minimal value of that interest, the 
taxpayer accordingly claims a substantial loss on sale ($1,000X in the 
example above).
225
 As is the case with the contingent liability shelter, the 
taxpayer is not conducting business through the entity. Instead, Son-of-
BOSS, like the other tax strategies discussed above,
226
 involves a passive 
investment that would thus be subject to basketing under the provision 
proposed in this Article.  
 
 
 224. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, 255 (emphasis added). 
 225. See id. The IRS Notice outlines multiple arguments against the deduction of these 
noneconomic losses: 
 The purported losses resulting from the transactions described above do not represent bona 
fide losses reflecting actual economic consequences as required for purposes of § 165. . . . The 
purported tax benefits from these transactions may also be subject to disallowance under other 
provisions of the Code and regulations. In particular, the transactions may be subject to challenge 
under § 752, or under § 1.701-2 or other anti-abuse rules. In addition, in the case of individuals, 
these transactions may be subject to challenge under § 165(c)(2). See Fox v. Commissioner, 82 
T.C. 1001 (1984). 
Id. 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 169–219. 
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2. Cross-Border Dividend-Stripping Transactions 
Cross-border dividend-stripping transactions are a distinct type of tax 
shelter in that they take advantage of the foreign tax credit, which, as 
indicated above,
227
 generally allows an offset against the federal income tax 
for foreign taxes.
228
 The foreign tax credit is designed to avoid double 
taxation by allowing a taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar credit to offset taxes paid 
to foreign jurisdictions.
229
 In Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner
230
 
and IES Industries v. United States,
231
 the taxpayer invested in American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are certificates reflecting stock 
ownership in a foreign corporation.
232
 In Compaq, for example: 
Compaq purchased the ADRs ―cum dividend‖ for $887.577 million 
and immediately resold the ADRs ―ex-dividend‖ for $868.412 million 
to the same party from whom the interests were acquired. The 
dividend amount was $22.546 million. A 15% withholding tax of 
$3.382 million applied, however, so Compaq received a net dividend 
amount of $19.164 million. The transaction costs totaled $1.486 
million. Thus, at the end of the day, Compaq lost $19.165 million on 
the sale of the stock, received a net dividend amount of $19.164 
million, and paid $1.486 million in transaction costs.
233
  
Compaq also paid U.S. tax on the gross dividend.
234
 Before taxes, the 
transaction was therefore a net loser for Compaq: ―After taking into account 
the loss on the sale and transaction costs, . . . Compaq reported $1.895 
 
 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 136–37. 
 228. See I.R.C. § 901(a) (2006) (―If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefits of this subpart, the 
tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject to the limitation of section 904, be credited with the amounts 
provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b) . . . .‖); id. § 901(b)(1) (―Subject to the 
limitation of section 904, the following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under subsection (a): . . . 
In the case of a citizen of the United States and of a domestic corporation, the amount of any income, 
war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or 
to any possession of the United States . . . .‖). 
 229. McCormack, supra note 219, at 714. 
 230. 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev’d, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 231. [2001] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,470 (N.D. Iowa 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).  
 232. See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 215 (explaining that ADRs are ―trading unit[s] issued by a trust, 
which represent[] ownership of stock in a foreign corporation that is deposited with the trust. ADR‘s 
[sic] are the customary form of trading foreign stocks on U.S. stock exchanges . . . .‖). In both Compaq 
and IES, Twenty-First Securities Corporation suggested the transaction. See Compaq, 277 F.3d at 779; 
IES, 253 F.3d at 352. 
 233. McCormack, supra note 219, at 761 (footnotes omitted). 
 234. Id. 
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million in income, yielding $640,000 in U.S. tax.‖235 However, Compaq 
claimed a $3.382 million foreign tax credit for the withholding tax in the 
amount referred to above.
236
 Compaq thus came out ahead after taxes.  
Compaq profited after taxes because of the combination of the foreign tax 
credit and the market value of the ADRs ex-dividend. It would seem that the 
market price of the ADRs should have fallen by the entire amount of the 
dividend once that dividend was paid (that is, by $22.546 million—to 
$865.031 million), rather than by $3.382 million short of that (approximately 
$19.165 million). Compaq therefore received about $3.382 million more on 
the sale than one might expect. ―This seemingly odd effect occurred because 
most taxpayers could not use the foreign tax credits. As a result, these 
taxpayers actually lost the $3.382 million withheld, so they would be willing 
to sell the ex-dividend stock for [only] $19.165 million (the net dividend 
amount) less than the original price.‖237 
What Compaq did, therefore, was claim a foreign tax credit for taxes it 
actually paid but did not economically bear.
238
 In response to transactions of 
this type, Congress enacted Code § 901(k), which has a holding period 
requirement for the foreign tax credit.
239
 This imposes a friction because a 
holding period exposes the taxpayer to market risk.
240
 In Compaq and IES, 
the immediate resale avoided exposure to price fluctuations.
241
 
Thus, Compaq and IES were dividend-stripping transactions
242
 involving 
ADRs. As in the case of the four tax shelters discussed above,
243
 these cases 
involved a passive investment that would result in basketing under the 
proposal in this Article. That is, each taxpayer would have to basket the 
income, deductions, and the deduction equivalent of the foreign tax credit 
claimed,
244
 so the deductions and credits generated in the transaction would 
only be available to offset passive income. In IES, for example, where the 
 
 
 235. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. at 762 (footnote omitted). 
 238. See id. at 714. 
 239. I.R.C. § 901(k) (2006). 
 240. See Lederman, supra note 91, at 439. 
 241. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm‘r, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001) (―23 purchase 
transactions and 23 corresponding resale transactions—of about 450,000 ADRs each . . . were all 
completed in a little over an hour.‖); IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(―The purchase and sale generally took place within hours of each other . . . .‖). 
 242. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 
88 TAX NOTES 221, 221–22 (2000). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 169–226.  
 244. For example, under the proposal, the deduction equivalent of the $3.382 million foreign tax 
credit claimed by Compaq would be $9.663 million. See supra note 156; supra text accompanying 
note 236. 
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taxpayer used capital losses generated in a dividend-stripping transaction to 
offset gain on the sale of a subsidiary,
245
 basketing would undermine the 
utility of the shelter. If the transaction were used to shelter gains on the sale 
of portfolio stock, however, as it appears was the case in Compaq,
246
 the 
proposal would not impede the transaction, as it is designed to restrict the use 
of passive deductions and credits to offset active income. 
3. One-Off Tax Strategies 
Of course, some tax strategies are not cookie-cutter portfolio shelters, but 
rather are incorporated directly into business activity. A prime example 
involves United Parcel Service (UPS), which engaged in a restructuring to 
put its revenue from package insurance offshore and thus not subject it to 
U.S. tax.
247
 In that case, 
UPS . . . form[ed] and capitaliz[ed] a Bermuda subsidiary, Overseas 
Partners, Ltd. (OPL), almost all of whose shares were distributed as a 
taxable dividend to UPS shareholders (most of whom were 
employees; UPS stock was not publicly traded). UPS then purchased 
an insurance policy, for the benefit of UPS customers, from National 
Union Fire Insurance Company. By this policy, National Union 
assumed the risk of damage to or loss of excess-value shipments. The 
premiums for the policy were the excess-value charges that UPS 
collected. UPS, not National Union, was responsible for administering 
claims brought under the policy. National Union in turn entered a 
reinsurance treaty with OPL. Under the treaty, OPL assumed risk 
commensurate with National Union‘s, in exchange for premiums that 
equal the excess-value payments National Union got from UPS, less 
commissions, fees, and excise taxes.
248
 
 
 
 245. See IES, 253 F.3d at 352. IES carried back capital losses from its dividend-stripping 
transaction to offset capital gains recognized in previous tax years. Id. Most of those losses were from 
the sale of a subsidiary. See Kevin M. Keyes, Evolving Business Purpose Doctrine, in TAX 
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, 
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2007, at 253, 269 (PLI Tax Law & Estate 
Planning, Course Handbook Ser. No. 852, 2008). 
 246. Compaq used the foreign tax credit to offset capital gain on the sale of stock in a publicly 
traded company. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm‘r, 113 T.C. 214, 215, 220 (1999), rev’d, 277 F.3d 
778 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Compaq was not affiliated with that company, Compaq‘s ownership 
interest in it probably would not be substantial enough to require look-through under the rules 
proposed in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 152–53. 
 247. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r (UPS), 254 F.3d 1014, 1016 (11th Cir. 
2001).  
 248. Id. 
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 ―Thus, if what UPS did was effective, it transferred the excess-value-
charge income offshore, though the business remained unchanged and the 
income ultimately benefited the same shareholders as before.‖249 The Tax 
Court found that the strategy lacked a business purpose and economic 
substance, and was motivated by tax-avoidance concerns.
250
 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the transaction had 
both a business purpose and economic substance, but it remanded the case to 
the Tax Court for consideration of statutory arguments.
251
 
The basketing provision proposed in this Article would not target 
strategies, like the one used in UPS, which are tailored to a particular 
company‘s business. However, those shelters appear to be less common than 
shelters in which any company can invest.
252
 Strategies that are tied to a 
particular company‘s business are more costly to develop and difficult to 
replicate.
253
 Thus, although the proposed reform would not put a stop to all 
creative ways of eliminating taxes on profits, it would address the most 
significant part of the problem. 
III. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL 
The discussion above
254
 has shown that the principal benefit of basketing 
corporations‘ passive expenses and losses only with passive income is 
restriction of tax shelter activity. However, it did not address the potential 
drawbacks of the proposal. The proposal, although targeted to address much 
abusive tax sheltering activity, is not perfect. The likely principal objections 
to it are (1) it is underinclusive, not tackling all tax sheltering; (2) it is 
overbroad, barring a deduction for legitimate expenses and losses; and (3) it 
is too complex. These objections are addressed, in turn, below. 
 
 
 249. Lederman, supra note 91, at 429. 
 250. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 296 (1999). 
 251. UPS, 254 F.3d at 1020. 
 252. See Sheppard, supra note 110, at 304 (―Doubtless most large-outlay tax shelters occur on the 
portfolio side of a corporation‘s activities; it‘s hard to construct a shelter around an active business. A 
company could really lose money doing that.‖); Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (―([It] . . . seems 
likely) [that] active business shelters are much harder to design than portfolio shelters . . . .‖); see also 
Sheppard, supra note 91, at 784 (―Of course, under a schedular system, a corporation determined to 
shave taxes could design a shelter around a real operating business, but the necessity of having to run 
an active business to save taxes should not trouble anyone. (The only active business in most shelters 
seems to be the rendering of professional advice.)‖). 
 253. See Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (explaining why active business shelters are harder to 
design). 
 254. See supra Part II. 
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A. The Underinclusiveness Objection 
There are two principal aspects to the objection that a basketing proposal 
will not catch all corporate tax shelters. Professor Lawrence Zelenak has 
explained: 
It is unclear . . . how successful [the basketing] approach might be. In 
some cases, the income to be sheltered will itself be in the portfolio 
basket, and thus shelterable by a tax shelter loss in the portfolio basket. 
In other cases, the income to be sheltered will be in the active business 
basket, but shelter promoters may be able to design a shelter which 
also goes into the active basket.
255
 
These concerns are not as troubling as they might initially seem. On the 
first issue, as Professor Zelenak goes on to state,
256
 and as the discussion 
above of a number of 1990s tax shelters suggests,
257
 it seems that most of the 
income that corporations have tried to shelter is active business income. This 
is not surprising because the main revenue stream businesses produce is 
business income. By analogy, the individuals who invested in the shelters of 
the 1970s and 1980s often were seeking to shelter salary income,
258
 which is 
why the passive activity loss rules, which limit the deductibility of passive 
earnings from another active business to the amount of passive income gains, 
succeeded in eliminating those shelters.
259
 Certainly, putting a stop to 
sheltering active business income through the use of abusive tax strategies 
would address a substantial problem.  
One concern if the proposal were enacted would be ―trafficking‖ in 
passive losses and credits, along the lines of efforts of profitable companies 
to acquire net operating losses
260
 by acquiring companies with such losses.
261
 
 
 
 255. Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (footnotes omitted). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See supra notes 169–251 and accompanying text. 
 258. See John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, 
Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 110 (1988) 
(Before 1986, ―[t]he public apparently perceived that high-income individuals were using tax shelters 
to reduce or even eliminate the current incidence of taxation on their portfolio income and salaries.‖). 
 259. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Similarly, Code § 163(d), which limits the 
deductibility of individuals‘ investment interest to their net investment income, functions as a real 
limitation on deductibility. See I.R.C. § 163(d) (2006); Linette M. Barclay & Christopher P. 
McConnell, Interest Deductions by Individuals: Tax Planning is Essential to Get Through the Intricate 
Maze of New Rules, 19 TAX ADVISER 165, 167 (1988) (―The maximum amount of investment interest 
that one can deduct in any year is equal to net investment income . . . .‖). The passive activity loss 
rules and limitation on investment interest are discussed in Part I.B. 
 260. See I.R.C. § 172(a) (―There shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount 
equal to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus (2) the net operating 
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A company with excess passive losses or credits would have an incentive to 
try to monetize them rather than simply carrying them over to the next year, 
especially if it was experiencing cash flow issues.
262
  
For companies with net profits, losses and credits would shelter that 
income, so profitable companies have an incentive to try to acquire them. 
The proposal advanced in this Article only imposes a limitation on the 
deductibility of passive items; active losses and credits would still be able to 
be offset against passive or active income. Therefore, a profitable company 
could use active losses to offset its income, whether or not that income is 
composed in whole or in part of passive items. However, the Code defines 
net operating loss as ―the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter 
over the gross income.‖263 Thus, net operating losses include active losses, 
but not losses that would be disallowed by the proposal.  
The Code contains provisions specifically designed to eliminate 
trafficking in net operating losses.
264
 However, only one provision, Code 
§ 269, currently is broad enough to reach trafficking in net passive losses.
265
 
It provides, in part: 
(a) In general. If— 
 (1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 
8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or 
                                                                                                                         
 
loss carrybacks to such year.‖); id. § 172(c) (―For purposes of this section, the term ‗net operating loss‘ 
means the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income.‖). 
 261. See Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 132 (1991) (―Over the years, taxpayers have devised a variety of schemes for 
transferring the net operating loss deduction so that it can be used to average income between different 
taxpayers, rather than between different tax years of one taxpayer. Congress and the courts have 
reacted by erecting a number of barriers to corporate taxpayers‘ trafficking in net operating loss 
deductions.‖). I am grateful to Christopher Hanna for suggesting this ploy in the passive loss context. 
 262. The proposal would allow unused passive items to be carried forward indefinitely. See supra 
text accompanying notes 94–95. However, losses and credits that are deferred for specific purposes are 
not as valuable as ones that are usable currently. 
 263. I.R.C. § 172(c). Section 172 is in Chapter 1, ―Normal Taxes and Surtaxes,‖ which would be 
the logical chapter in which to situate the basketing provision proposed in this Article. 
 264. See id. § 382 (limiting the use of net operating losses following an ownership change); id. 
§ 384 (disallowing the use of preacquisition net operating losses to offset built-in gains in certain 
corporate acquisitions); see also id. § 269 (giving Secretary of the Treasury authority to disallow 
deductions, credits, and other allowances acquired in certain contexts, where ―the principal purpose for 
which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the 
benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would not 
otherwise enjoy . . . .‖). 
 265. See id. § 269. One commentator has explained: ―Section 269 has been most frequently used 
by the Service to disregard the acquisition of companies acquired to utilize their net operating losses or 
to gain multiple surtax exemptions.‖ Marilyn Barrett, Independent Contractor/Employee Classification 
in the Entertainment Industry: The Old, the New and the Continuing Uncertainty, 13 U. MIAMI ENT. & 
SPORTS L. REV. 91, 109 n.53 (1995). 
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 (2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 
1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not 
controlled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, 
by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which 
property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by 
reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation, and 
the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion 
or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a 
deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation 
would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary may disallow such 
deduction, credit, or other allowance.
266
 
Section 269 therefore gives the IRS discretion to challenge the acquisition 
of tax benefits for tax-avoidance purposes. By contrast, Code §§ 382 and 384 
disallow net operating losses more directly.
267
 Therefore, if the basketing 
proposal advanced in this Article were enacted without changing other 
provisions, profitable corporations would be more readily able to acquire net 
passive losses than to acquire net operating losses.
268
 To prevent that, §§ 382 
and 384 could be amended to bring net corporate passive losses within their 
scope.
269
  
On the second issue raised by Professor Zelenak—that ―shelter promoters 
may be able to design a shelter which also goes into the active basket‖270—
most of the well-known corporate tax shelters involved passive 
investments.
271
 That is not coincidental; passive investment structures are 
much more easily replicated. Sheltering active business income often will 
require tailoring a shelter to a particular business or industry, as with the 
offshore strategy in the UPS case.
272
 It is generally less costly to design a 
prewired strategy involving securities than to design a shelter built into a 
business.  
 
 
 266. I.R.C. § 269(a). 
 267. See id. §§ 382, 384.  
 268. One commentator explains: ―Although the subjective test of section 269 enabled the Service 
to limit net operating loss transfers in the most egregious cases, the objective test of section 382 
proved more successful in limiting such transfers.‖ Michelle M. Arnopol, Why Have Chapter 11 
Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably? A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts to Protect a 
Corporation’s Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 147 (1992) 
(footnote omitted). 
 269. An alternative would be to create a parallel regime for net passive losses. However, that 
would be less efficient than enlarging the scope of existing §§ 382 and 384.  
 270. Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (footnote omitted). 
 271. See supra text accompanying notes 162–246.  
 272. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r (UPS), 254 F.3d 1014, 1016–17 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
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Putting a stop to the development of corporate tax shelters that can be 
purchased ―off the rack‖ would be incredibly valuable for the fisc, even if a 
niche market remains for custom ―tailored‖ tax strategies. Professor Zelenak 
concludes, for similar reasons, that, despite the concerns he mentioned, ―the 
schedular approach seems worthy of further consideration.‖273 He explains:  
If (as seems likely) most income to be sheltered is from active 
businesses, and if (as also seems likely) active business shelters are 
much harder to design than portfolio shelters, then a schedular system 
would seriously impede shelter activity, even if it did not succeed in 
shutting down all shelters.
274
 
It is possible, however, that if the proposed provision were enacted, 
corporations subject to it would respond by trying to convert passive losses 
into active ones to avoid the basketing requirement. For example, the general 
definition under § 954(c) encompasses interest and dividends, as well as 
income from the sale of assets that give rise to passive income,
275
 but it 
provides an exception for ―dealers in securities.‖276 For securities dealers, 
items from ―transaction[s] . . . entered into in the ordinary course of such 
dealer‘s trade or business as such a dealer‖ are not taken into account, so long 
as ―the income from the transaction is attributable to activities of the dealer in 
the country under the laws of which the dealer is created or organized.‖277 A 
company might consider setting up a brokerage business to avail itself of this 
provision, claiming that the tax strategy was considered part of the U.S. 
brokerage business, so the loss was active.
278
 However, in situations in which 
taxpayers purchased a cloned tax shelter, such as those in ACM, Black & 
Decker, and the other shelters discussed above, an examination of the facts 
and circumstances likely would reveal that the shelter was not entered into in 
the ordinary course of the securities business.
279
  
 
 
 273. Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192.  
 274. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 275. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1) (2006). 
 276. Id. § 954(c)(2)(C)(ii). 
 277. Id.  
 278. I am grateful to Stephanie McMahon for raising and discussing this issue with me. 
 279. This inquiry is a concrete one that courts should be equipped to perform. Note that, for 
example, Code § 954(c) requires a determination of whether a ―transaction [was] entered into by the 
taxpayer in the normal course of the taxpayer‘s trade or business‖ in the context of determining 
whether it is a ―commodity hedging transaction[].‖ See I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(1)(C)(i); 1221(b)(2)(A)(i); 
infra text accompanying notes 282–84. In addition, setting up a new line of business involves 
substantial costs, which would be a deterrent in itself. Moreover, assuming a corporation bore the costs 
of starting the new line of business and was successful in its claim that the shelter losses did not 
constitute passive items within the meaning of § 954(c), the losses still would not accomplish the 
company‘s goal of sheltering profits from its original business if the brokerage business earned profits 
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Nonetheless, some taxpayers probably would escape the strictures of the 
proposed provision, finding a way to avoid basketing of passive deductions 
and credits or a way to convert active income into passive income for 
purposes of the basketing restriction. The proposed provision raises the cost 
of these efforts, however, and thus would at least serve as a friction that 
should reduce tax sheltering.  
B. The Overinclusiveness Objection 
1. Limiting Overinclusiveness 
Another problem with basketing is that some items that are disallowed 
might be ones that, in theory, seemingly should be allowed. As the Treasury 
Department noted, ―Applying such rules [as § 469] in response to corporate 
tax shelter transactions casts a wide net—one that would catch both 
taxpayers that engage in sheltering transactions as well as those that do 
not.‖280  
Importantly, the proposed basketing rule should not apply to hedges of 
commodities related to the taxpayer‘s business, such as corn futures 
purchased by a manufacturer of cornstarch and corn syrup.
281
 Code § 954(c) 
excludes gains and losses that ―arise out of commodity hedging 
transactions.‖282 Commodity hedging transactions are defined by reference to 
Code § 1221(b)(2).
283
 This includes ―any transaction entered into by the 
taxpayer in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business primarily . . . 
to manage risk of price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to 
ordinary property which is held or to be held by the taxpayer.‖284 Thus, the 
proposal should not apply to hedges of commodities in order to assure a 
source of supply of inventory or raw materials, for example. 
                                                                                                                         
 
at least equal to the loss from the shelter. Therefore, if the brokerage business were successful, the 
taxpayer would have to increase the size of the shelter in order to receive a tax benefit from the shelter 
loss. This would increase its cost and the likelihood that the shelter would be detected. If, on the other 
hand, the brokerage business were unsuccessful, that would increase the taxpayer‘s pretax costs. 
 280. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 90, at 113. 
 281. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm‘r, 350 U.S. 46, 48 (1955) (describing taxpayer, 
which transacted in corn futures, as ―a nationally known manufacturer of products made from grain 
corn. It manufactures starch, syrup, sugar, and their byproducts, feeds and oil.‖) 
 282. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(C)(i). 
 283. Id. § 954(c)(5)(A) (applying I.R.C. § 1221(b)(2) with certain modifications). Section 
954(c)(5)(A)(i)(III) requires the substitution of ―‗controlled foreign corporation‘ for ‗taxpayer‘ each 
place it appears‖ in § 1221(b)(2), which should not be carried over to the basketing proposal. Id. 
§ 954(c)(5)(A)(i)(III). 
 284. Id. § 1221(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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Aside from specific exceptions like this one, the overinclusive nature of 
basketing is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid without a motive test. 
However, adding a motive test would be unwise because motive is inherently 
subjective. Motive and purpose inquiries are necessarily fact-sensitive and 
thus costly. They also open the door to taxpayer manipulation. Such is the 
case with the ―business purpose‖ prong of the economic substance doctrine, 
for example.
285
 
The passive activity loss rules of § 469 also operate to deter or disallow 
losses without regard to whether the transaction involves an abusive tax 
shelter. For example, if an individual taxpayer is a passive investor in 
another‘s active business, and the taxpayer‘s investment loses money, the 
loss is subject to § 469 even if the transaction lacked any abusive elements.
286
 
This is therefore a cost of the basketing proposal, and one not readily 
avoided. The questions this issue raises are therefore how high the costs are, 
how those costs compare to the benefits of the proposal, and whether another 
alternative offers a more favorable cost-benefit ratio. The costs and benefits 
are very difficult to quantify. However, the $10 million threshold for 
applicability of the proposed provision will help reduce overinclusiveness 
and compliance costs. 
Beyond that, the passive activity loss provision offers a historical analogy. 
The provision is widely viewed as having eliminated the individual tax 
shelters of the 1970s and 1980s.
287
 That is a substantial benefit, given the 
deadweight loss that tax sheltering entails.
288
 However, given its broad 
applicability, it likely has had some impact on passive investing in others‘ 
businesses, such as deterring individuals from making venture capital 
investments.
289
 
 
 
 285. See Lederman, supra note 91, at 398 n.27, 433. 
 286. See Lederman, supra note 59, at 1433 (giving example of taxpayer investing in a bakery run 
by a partnership). 
 287. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 288. See Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 
274 (2002) (―The most easily measured social cost of corporate tax shelters is the cost to promoters 
and taxpayers of developing, marketing, and executing the strategies. Such expenditures yield little 
social benefit and so may be counted as a deadweight loss.‖). 
 289. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 
1767 (1994) (―A start-up organized as a partnership could provide its partners with tax losses. 
However, the ability of individual partners to use those losses would be constrained by the alternative 
minimum tax and the passive loss rules.‖). Victor Fleischer explains:  
Absent unusual circumstances, . . . the passive loss rules prevent limited partners in venture capital 
funds from immediately using the losses, as LPs [limited partners] do not normally help manage 
the portfolio companies in any significant way. The tax losses in the pass-through structure flow 
through to the venture capital fund and then to the LPs, but individuals may not use those losses 
immediately to offset taxable income from nonpassive activities.  
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In the corporate context, the benefit of the proposed provision would be 
analogous to the benefit of the passive activity loss rules: a severe limitation 
on sheltering of active income. The dollar amounts involved in tax sheltering 
in the 1990s were substantial.
290
 Although sheltering waned in the 2000s in 
the face of a multipronged attack by the government and, more recently, 
declining corporate income, this is a problem that will likely resurface once 
companies are profitable.
291
 Although Congress and the Treasury have closed 
the loopholes that facilitated certain tax shelters,
292
 taxpayers will inevitably 
find others. Disclosure requirements and increased penalties provide greater 
deterrence than previous rules did, but probably not enough. The IRS can 
                                                                                                                         
 
Fleischer, supra note 97, at 154–55 (footnote omitted). That is one reason start-up companies seeking 
venture capital may be inclined to organize as C corporations despite the corporate double tax. See 
Bankman, supra, at 1754–66 (discussing a number of possible reasons for start-ups‘ use of the 
corporate form); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 751, 770 (2005) (noting tax incentives of using the corporate form). Because start-up 
companies typically organize as C corporations, losses do not pass through, so the provision proposed 
in this Article should not reduce the benefits of using C corporations for venture capital start-up 
companies. See Fleischer, supra note 97, at 137. In theory, the proposed provision could apply if a 
corporate investor sold stock in a start-up at a loss and had capital gains sufficient to claim some or all 
of the loss. However, there is almost no market for stock in a privately held start-up corporation. See 
Fred Wilson, A Second Market is Emerging, A VC: MUSINGS OF A VC IN NYC (Apr. 23, 2009), 
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2009/04/a-second-market-is-emerging.html. Moreover, most providers of 
venture capital are tax-exempt organizations. See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital 
Revolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 151 tbl.1 (2001) (corporate investors were only 2% to 17% of 
venture capital funds in years examined); see also Bankman, supra, at 1753 (―In recent years, . . . a 
majority of the investment in start-ups has come from tax-exempt institutional investors, such as 
pensions and university endowments.‖); Fleischer, supra note 97, at 158 (―Tax-exempt entities, such 
as pension funds and university endowments, comprise the largest investor class in the venture capital 
industry.‖). 
 290. See, e.g., U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-171, TAX SHELTERS: SERVICES 
PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL AUDITORS 11, 12 tbl.3 (2005) (estimating that, in 1998 through 2003, tax 
shelters cost the federal fisc almost $129 billion); Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1389 (―In 
recent years, accounting and law firms have marketed aggressive prepackaged tax shelters called loss 
generators. . . . Loss generators can be very large, sometimes producing claimed tax losses in excess of 
$100 million.‖). 
 291. See Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1391 (―Shelters may not reemerge as a major 
problem soon, [in part] . . . because there may not be much income needing sheltering for the next few 
years. It would be a major mistake . . . to assume that the tax shelter dragon has been slain once and for 
all.‖) The article further argues that ―[t]ax shelters could return—perhaps with a vengeance—if the 
federal judiciary were to become less receptive to the government‘s invocation of the various 
common-law antiabuse doctrines.‖ Id. On March 30, 2010, Congress added § 7701(o) to ―clarify‖ the 
judicially developed economic substance doctrine. See Monte A. Jackel, Dawn of a New Era: 
Congress Codifies Economic Substance, 127 TAX NOTES 289, 289 n.2 (2010). Although the new 
provision may foster uniformity in the application of the doctrine, it does not eliminate the substantive 
problems with the doctrine. See generally Lederman, supra note 91 (arguing that the economic 
substance doctrine‘s focus on taxpayer intent and the prospect of pretax profit renders the doctrine 
easy for taxpayers to manipulate). 
 292. For example, Congress enacted § 358(h) to shut down the contingent liability shelter. See 
Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 
1637 n.30 (2009). 
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easily become overburdened with the volume of disclosures, particularly in 
the face of incentives for both the risk averse and the aggressive to engage in 
overdisclosure.
293
 And even the higher penalties are not substantial enough to 
provide adequate deterrence unless audit rates are increased to unrealistic 
levels.
294
 The revised Circular 230 rules, designed to limit the use of tax 
opinions as ―penalty insurance‖ for shelters,295 similarly are helpful but 
insufficient if the penalty itself is an insufficient deterrent. 
The costs of the corporate basketing proposal would also be analogous to 
those of the passive activity loss rules. That is, the proposal would raise the 
cost of corporate passive investment by reducing deductions available for 
expenses (such as interest paid) and losses. However, because the proposal 
only disallows passive deductions in excess of passive income, it should have 
a somewhat limited deterrent effect on investments designed to produce 
income. That is, the proposal should effectively deter investments designed 
to produce losses (tax strategies). However, for real investments, such as 
straightforward purchases of stock, the taxpayer would need to discount the 
cost of the provision by the probability it would apply. For example, a stock 
purchase on margin (thus incurring interest expense), might have only a 
relatively small probability of returning income less than the interest expense.  
2. A Possible Alternative 
Thus, the analogy of the passive activity loss rules and the corporate 
context itself suggest that the overinclusive aspect of basketing imposes costs 
that are small in comparison to the benefits basketing offers. Nonetheless, 
such a rule does impose costs, so the next question is whether there is an 
option with a more favorable cost-benefit ratio. Commentators have noted 
that there does not seem to be a ―silver bullet‖ that would address all 
corporate tax shelters.
296
 However, Calvin Johnson and Lawrence Zelenak 
 
 
 293. See generally id. (arguing that overdisclosure can be used to reduce the possibility that the 
government will detect abusive tax strategies). 
 294. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1465 (2003) (showing that, for example ―an audit rate of 1% would require a 
$99,000 penalty‖—a penalty of 990%—for the expected value to equal payment of $1,000 of tax). 
Even the 30% penalty under Code § 6662A for undisclosed ―listed . . . transactions‖ makes the 
expected value of cheating equal the expected value of compliance only at a 76.9% audit rate: $1,000 
of tax due is equivalent to 76.9% of $1,300 ($1,000 of tax plus a $300 penalty). I.R.C. § 6662A(c) 
(2006). 
 295. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2009). 
 296. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver 
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1951 (2005) (―What is wanted is a silver bullet (or perhaps a broad-
spectrum antibiotic) that would kill a wide variety of tax shelters, and do so in such a way that the 
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have proposed an amendment to Code § 165 that would address the 
deduction of noneconomic losses. Their proposal is to add to § 165(b) the 
following language: 
―No deduction shall be allowed for any loss claimed to have been 
incurred in connection with any transaction or series of transactions 
except to the extent that such loss accurately reflects a reduction in the 
taxpayer‘s net worth. Losses not allowed in a particular year under this 
paragraph may be allowed in a later year, when and if they reflect a 
measured reduction in net worth.‖297 
That proposal is a useful one, but, by its terms, it is limited to losses. It 
does not address the deductibility of expenses or the allowance of credits. 
Thus, although it would be very useful to address loss-generating shelters, 
including the four inflated-basis strategies discussed above, it would not 
target tax strategies such as the foreign tax credit strategy in Compaq and 
IES, which made use of the foreign tax credit.
298
 Although that strategy has 
since been limited statutorily, it provides an example of a corporate tax 
shelter that is not a loss generator. 
The Johnson and Zelenak proposal would thus not have quite the breadth 
of the basketing provision proposed in this Article. Its benefits would 
therefore not be as substantial. It would therefore also not entail the same 
costs. However, it would also have costs the basketing proposal would not 
have. Most importantly, the proposal would seem to require measuring the 
taxpayer‘s net worth before and after a transaction in order to determine if 
and when the taxpayer‘s net worth has declined. For many taxpayers, that 
would be a challenging endeavor, given the complexity of their finances and 
the complexity of the transactions in question. After-the-fact reconstruction 
of net worth by the IRS might also be more complex than applying a 
basketing provision because of disputes over what items affect net worth, and 
to what extent.
299
  
                                                                                                                         
 
government would no longer always be playing catch up . . . . It is not immediately obvious, however, 
how that might be done.‖). 
 297. Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1392. The proposal would allow for exceptions: 
[T]he proposal would give Treasury the authority to identify those situations by regulation and to 
exempt them from the application of new section 165(b)(2). There is a precedent for this 
approach; Treasury has successfully written partnership antiabuse rules, with many examples of 
transactions considered abusive and transactions specifically allowed. Also, Congress could, if it 
wanted, include in the legislation its own listing of particular types of artificial losses that are not 
subject to disallowance. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 227–41. 
 299. For example, depreciation is accelerated for tax purposes. See Christopher H. Hanna, The 
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In addition, the Johnson and Zelenak proposal appears to apply to all 
taxpayers, not just corporations.
300
 That would increase the compliance cost 
taxpayers face. For example, it would apply to individuals, although tax 
sheltering by individuals has not been a substantial problem since 1986 in 
light of the passive activity loss rules and other rules,
301
 such as the limitation 
on interest of § 163(d) and the at-risk rules of § 465.
302
 Finally, the proposal 
has another scope issue, which is that it does not have a de minimis 
exception, so even low-income taxpayers and small corporations would need 
to apply it. 
C. The Complexity Objection: Segregating Corporations’ Passive and 
Active Items 
Most new tax provisions add some amount of complexity to an already 
complicated set of rules. The proposed provision is no exception. The 
specific complexity it would add is a requirement that corporations subject to 
it identify and segregate their passive items. The asset-based threshold
303
 
would eliminate that burden for small corporations, but large corporations 
would still bear it. Of course, it is important to note, as mentioned above,
304
 
that multinational corporations are already required to sort their passive and 
active items for several other purposes and that the proposed provision would 
rely on the same definitional section. However, the proposal would require 
large domestic corporations to sort out items that previously had been 
bundled. 
The Treasury raised the complexity concern about basketing in a 1999 
white paper, stating: 
                                                                                                                         
 
Real Value of Tax Deferral, 61 FLA. L. REV. 203, 228 (2009) (―Under the Code, a corporation may 
depreciate tangible personal property under an accelerated method of depreciation.‖). How does that 
affect net worth? Litigation on the IRS‘s application of the ―net worth‖ method of reconstructing a 
taxpayer‘s income where the taxpayer‘s records were inadequate or do not accurately reflect income 
suggests how complex net worth calculations can be. See, e.g., Erickson v. Comm‘r, 937 F.2d 1548, 
1550–52 (10th Cir. 1991) (analyzing whether the cost of marijuana should be included in the 
Commission‘s determination of net worth); United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 922–23 (6th Cir. 
1990) (examining whether an airplane legally titled to a corporation should increase its sole 
shareholder‘s net worth); Estate of Upshaw v. Comm‘r, 416 F.2d 737, 743–44 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(analyzing whether accrued federal income tax liabilities reduce net worth). 
 300. See Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1392. 
 301. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 302. See I.R.C. §§ 163(d), 465 (2006); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra text 
accompanying note 35. 
 303. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03. 
 304. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
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 A broad basketing or schedular system limited to corporate tax 
shelters would be difficult to design, implement and enforce. Unlike 
individuals, corporations engage in a wide variety of activities and 
often grow and diversify into new activities. Because money is 
fungible, tracing tax benefits derived from financing transactions to 
taxable income from activities for which the financing is used (and 
vice versa) would be difficult.
305
  
The Treasury‘s comparison suggests that basketing is more complex for 
corporations than for individuals because corporations engage in a broader 
range of activities. In one sense, individuals may engage in a broader range 
of activities than corporations because, like corporations, they engage in 
business activities as well as nonbusiness profit-seeking (investment-type) 
activities,
306
 but, unlike corporations, they engage in personal activities as 
well. In fact, individuals often need to distinguish among those items, 
whether for basketing purposes, as discussed above,
307
 or because of 
limitations on or disallowance of deductions of a particular type. For 
example, an individual with deductible nonemployee business expenses can 
deduct them above the line
308
 but must treat expenses to produce most 
investment income as disfavored ―miscellaneous itemized deductions.‖309 An 
individual‘s personal expenses generally are not deductible at all.310 
Yet, in another sense, corporations may engage in a broader range of 
activities than individuals because they can more easily expand into a range 
of activities that require large numbers of workers. However, corporations 
doing that typically will have more sophisticated record-keeping systems 
 
 
 305. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 90, at 118. The white paper also stated: ―Limiting 
schedular taxation to corporate tax shelters would require a definition and identification of the 
offending transactions.‖ Id. at 118–19. That concern does not apply to the proposal that is the subject 
of this Article because basketing would not be limited to tax shelter transactions. See supra text 
accompanying notes 90–92. 
 306. See supra text accompanying notes 108–09.  
 307. See supra Part I.B. 
 308. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1). 
 309. See id. §§ 62(a), 67(b). Miscellaneous itemized deductions are subject to a number of 
limitations on their deductibility. See id. § 63 (providing individual taxpayer with a choice between 
itemizing and claiming standard deduction); id. § 67 (2% floor on itemized deductions); id. § 68 
(overall limitation on itemized deductions). As these limitations suggest, an individual‘s trade or 
business activity is often privileged over nonbusiness profit-seeking activity. See Lederman, supra 
note 59, at 1450. Under case law, the distinction between the two types of profit-seeking endeavors is 
whether the activity is sufficiently ―active.‖ See id. (―To square Higgins [v. Comm‘r, 312 U.S. 212 
(1941)] with [Comm‘r v.] Groetzinger, [480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987),] the focus must be on the ‗active‘ or 
‗passive‘ nature of the taxpayer‘s earnings.‖). 
 310. See I.R.C. § 262 (providing general rule that ―no deduction shall be allowed for personal, 
living, or family expenses.‖). 
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than individuals with fewer activities. Those record-keeping systems 
facilitate compliance with the tax laws. 
It is true that any rule that distinguishes among distinct types of items 
requires some sorting and tracing. However, it is very possible for 
corporations to do that in the passive/active context. As discussed above, 
multinational corporations are already required to do so in at least three 
contexts
311
: Subpart F of the Code requires separation of the passive and 
active income of each CFC, because the passive income is taxed currently, 
while active income is taxed only upon repatriation;
312
 the PFIC regime 
requires identification of a foreign corporation‘s passive and active income 
and assets in order to determine whether the corporation is a PFIC, which 
subjects U.S. shareholders to antideferral tax rules;
313
 and the foreign tax 
credit regime requires separation of passive income into a distinct basket 
from other income, so as to prohibit cross-crediting across categories.
314
 
Large domestic corporations should be equally well equipped to identify the 
passive items that fall within the § 954(c) definition and separate them out 
from their other items. 
CONCLUSION 
In the federal income tax, basketing of deductions with related income is 
an exception to the general rule that deductions can be taken from any 
income, regardless of source. It is nonetheless used fairly frequently in the 
individual federal income tax to prevent deductions from reducing tax on 
unrelated income. Some of the basketing provisions applicable to individuals 
function, at least in part, as anti-tax-shelter devices. 
Many of the basketing provisions applicable to individuals could, in 
theory, apply to corporate taxpayers, though they generally do not. 
Conceptually, there is no reason why corporate expenses and losses could not 
be subject to basketing. In fact, many of the cookie-cutter corporate tax 
shelters developed in the 1990s would not have worked if corporations‘ 
passive losses were only allowed to offset passive income. 
Basketing does not work perfectly to disallow only tax shelter items. As 
the passive activity loss rules of Code § 469 illustrate,
315
 basketing does not 
capture all tax shelters, and it also sweeps in some bona fide investments. 
 
 
 311. See supra Part II.A.2.b–c. 
 312. See generally supra notes 136–42 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 117–30. 
 314. See supra text accompanying notes 139–41. 
 315. I.R.C. § 469 (2006). 
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However, as § 469 illustrates,
316
 basketing can be quite effective in curbing 
tax shelters without impeding much legitimate activity. The proposed 
provision would work similarly because it would exempt from its ambit 
corporations with relatively low capitalization, which likely do not have the 
resources to invest in tax shelters, and it would allow unused losses to be 
carried forward. 
Basketing does add complexity, but corporate taxpayers typically are 
better suited to bear that complexity than most individuals are. Multinational 
corporations already are required to identify and separate passive-source 
income for many purposes. The proposal would use the same definition for 
passive income items and require C corporations to identify expenses and 
losses of the same types for basketing purposes. It would therefore introduce 
the minimal additional complexity needed for this type of basketing.  
The benefits of the proposal would be analogous to the benefits of the 
―passive activity loss‖ rules of Code § 469: the proposed provision would 
severely restrict the deductibility of tax shelter losses from other income. 
Corporations could still develop methods to remove income from the federal 
tax base, but those techniques typically are more specialized and thus have a 
lower return on investment to promoters and a lower cost to the federal fisc. 
Most importantly, corporations would no longer be able to use investments in 
securities to lower the tax rate on either their business income or gains from 
the sale of businesses. Unless they had substantial income from passive 
sources such as dividends and interest, passive losses simply would do them 
no good. The proposal would therefore help prevent a resurgence of the 
corporate tax shelter problem. 
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